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ABSTRACT
NAVIGATING THE AUDITOR-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP DURING SENSITIVE
EVENTS: INSIGHT ON AUDIT FIRM PRACTICES AND AN EXPERIMENTAL
STUDY
MAY 2017
MARY CATHERINE DODGSON, B.S., LEHIGH UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Co-Directed by: Professors Christopher P. Agoglia and G. Bradley Bennett
Maintaining a positive auditor-client relationship is critical for audit firms,
particularly during sensitive events. For instance, audit firms state in transparency reports
that they take steps to minimize disruption during audit partner rotations, yet it is unclear
what these actions entail or the potential effects of these actions on auditor independence
and audit quality. I use multiple methods to provide insight into these practices and their
related effects. First, I interview 20 audit partners to learn about the process by which
audit firms manage the auditor-client relationship during sensitive partner rotation events.
Interviewees describe how audit firms identify appropriate partner candidates and
procedures followed to select and prepare the next lead partner. Respondents also
elaborate on firms’ ongoing relationship-managing activities, including the assignment of
non-decision-making liaisons (often referred to as relationship partners or "RPs") to a
subset of engagements to assist in navigating the auditor-client relationship during
sensitive events (i.e., in preparation for upcoming partner rotations and when contentious
auditor-client issues arise). Second, I conduct an experiment with financial executives to
examine the influence that RPs may have on the resolution of contentious auditor-client
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issues. I also consider how RP influence may vary depending on the extent to which the
audit partner and client manager have tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to resolve the issue
(i.e., negotiation ripeness). I find that, in a traditional setting in which a RP is not
involved, client managers concede less toward an audit partner's more appropriate
position when the negotiation has reached a more ripe stage than when the negotiation
stage is less ripe. However, I find it is at a more ripe stage that RP intervention is more
effective in moving client managers toward a resolution, limiting the risk of seeking
alternative methods of resolution that may impair the auditor-client relationship (e.g.,
issuing a qualified audit opinion). Collectively my findings inform regulators and
researchers about the ongoing process by which audit firms manage the auditor-client
relationship during sensitive events and how one common approach for managing the
auditor-client relationship (i.e., assignment of RPs to a subset of engagements) influences
the auditor-client relationship and audit quality.

Keywords: audit partner rotation; relationship partners; audit partner selection;
qualitative method; auditor-client relationships; auditor-client negotiations

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... xi
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... xii
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................1
2. MANAGING THE AUDITOR-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP THROUGH PARTNER
ROTATIONS: THE EXPERIENCES OF AUDIT PARTNERS ....................................5
2.1. Abstract ...................................................................................................................5
2.2. Introduction .............................................................................................................6
2.3. Social Exchange Theory and Audit Practice ........................................................10
2.4. Interview Method ..................................................................................................13
2.5. Insights and Analysis of Partner Interviews .........................................................16
2.6. Discussion .............................................................................................................37
3. THE INFLUENCE OF “RELATIONSHIP PARTNERS” ON CLIENT MANAGERS’
NEGOTIATION POSITIONS ......................................................................................48
3.1. Abstract .................................................................................................................48
3.2. Introduction ...........................................................................................................49
3.3. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development .................................................53
3.4. Method ..................................................................................................................59
3.5. Results ...................................................................................................................66
3.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................74
ix

4. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................84
APPENDICES
A. CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWS................................................................87
B. CONSENT FORM FOR EXPERIMENT ...............................................................88
C. EXPERIMENTAL SCREENING QUESTIONS....................................................89
D. EXPERIMENTAL CASE .......................................................................................90
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................132

x

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

Table 2.1: Interview Participant Demographics ................................................................41
Table 2.2: How Appropriate Partner Candidates Are Identified for
Upcoming Rotations ........................................................................................42
Table 2.3: Logistics of Planning for Rotations ..................................................................43
Table 2.4: Procedures Followed When Selecting and Preparing
The Next Engagement Partner for Rotation.....................................................44
Table 2.5: Early Phases of the Relationship (Post-Rotation).............................................45
Table 2.6: SET – A Summary of Theoretical Expectations and Major Findings ..............46
Table 3.1: Negotiation Limits ............................................................................................79
Table 3.2: Negotiation Limits by RP Approach ................................................................80
Table 3.3: Negotiation Counter Offers and Goals .............................................................81
Table 3.4: Negotiation Counter Offers and Goals by RP Approach..................................83

xi

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

Figure 2.1: Model of Partner Rotation Process as Described by Interviewees ..................40
Figure 3.1: Graph of Actual Results – Negotiation Limits ................................................76
Figure 3.2: Graph of Actual Results –Negotiation Limits by RP Approach .....................77
Figure 3.3: Mediating Relationship ...................................................................................78

xii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Maintaining a positive auditor-client relationship is critical for audit firms,
particularly during sensitive events. In my dissertation, I complete two studies to learn
about the measures that audit firms take to manage the auditor-client relationship during
sensitive events and the impact that such relationship management activities may have on
audit quality. The goal of the first study is to understand the events taking place within
audit firms, as well as between auditors and their clients, in the period surrounding a
sensitive partner rotation event. To do this, I interview experienced audit partners to
develop a descriptive framework of the process by which audit firms manage the auditorclient relationship through audit partner transitions, and to explore the effect that such
actions may have on auditor independence and quality. The goal of the second study is to
examine how one measure that audit firms take to manage the auditor-client relationship
(i.e., the role of "relationship partners") influences client managements' cooperation with
the auditors during challenging financial reporting issues, and by extension, audit quality.
To do this, I conduct an experiment to examine whether (and under what circumstances)
relationship partners are able to help navigate a resolution during an auditor-client
disagreement over a difficult financial reporting issue.
The first study is motivated by suggestions in audit firms' transparency reports
(KPMG 2015; PwC 2015; Deloitte 2015; E&Y 2015) and the academic literature
(Daugherty et al. 2012) that audit firms take steps to minimize disruption during sensitive
audit partner rotation events. Importantly, auditing standards merely lay out the
maximum number of years in which partners are allowed to remain on the engagement
1

and the number of years in the “cooling-off” period (i.e., a period in which they must be
off the engagement) (SEC 2003; SEC 2014). This leaves audit firms a great degree of
latitude to manage and implement rotations as they see fit, suggesting that in substance,
rotation may be more an ongoing process than a single event in time. Yet, a clearer
understanding of what these actions entail, and audit firms' motivation behind these
actions, is a necessary precursor to examining the influence that these individual firm
actions may have on auditor independence and audit quality.
The first study contributes to the literature by shedding light on the ongoing
process by which audit firms plan for and implement partner rotations in practice. For
instance, interviewees describe how audit firms identify appropriate partner candidates,
procedures followed to select and prepare the next lead partner, and post-rotation
measures taken to manage the auditor-client relationship. I use Social Exchange Theory
(e.g., Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; Blau 1964) to further analyze the interview data to
understand how and why auditors take such voluntary measures to manage the auditorclient relationship during these sensitive rotation events. This framework and analysis
provides opportunities for future research to consider the effect of these various steps on
auditor independence and audit quality. In addition, the findings of this study will help
inform regulators and researchers about the process by which lead audit partners are
selected for rotation onto their clients, an understudied area about which investors have
expressed continued interest (e.g., CAQ 2013), and which has potential to affect auditor
independence and audit quality.
The second study is motivated by a common measure unveiled in the first
(interview) study that audit firms use to manage the auditor-client relationship.
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Specifically, audit partner interviewees report assigning very experienced, senior
leadership partners as relationship liaisons to a subset of their clients (commonly referred
to as "relationship partners") in order to help navigate the auditor-client relationship.
With skills in relationship management, one major ongoing role that relationship partners
play is helping to navigate the auditor-client relationship during contentious auditor-client
issues. Navigating carefully through these tricky situations is essential for firms in
maintaining a positive auditor-client relationship, ensuring retention of clients in the
future. Further, resolution of sensitive issues is critical, due to their connection with
financial statement quality (c.f., Brown and Wright 2008).
In this second study, I conduct an experiment to examine the influence that
relationship partners may have on the resolution of subjective issues between auditors
and their clients. I also consider how relationship partner influence may vary depending
on the extent to which the audit partner and client manager have tried, albeit
unsuccessfully, to resolve the issue (i.e., negotiation ripeness). Drawing on the Ripeness
Theory of Third Party Intervention (e.g., Fischer 2011) commonly described in the
conflict management literature, I predict and find that, in a traditional setting in which a
RP is not involved, client managers concede less toward a position deemed appropriate
by the audit partner when the negotiation has reached a more ripe stage than when the
negotiation stage is less ripe. However, I find it is at a more ripe stage that RP
intervention is more effective in moving client managers toward a resolution. Thus, my
results suggest it is at this critical stage in which the audit partner and client manager
have reached a stalemate where the RP can have the most impact, limiting the risk of
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seeking alternative methods of resolution that may impair the auditor-client relationship
(e.g., issuing a qualified audit opinion).
The second study contributes to the literature by informing audit practitioners and
researchers of the impact RPs can have on auditor-client negotiations, as well as the stage
at which RPs will be most successful in moving towards issue resolution. This study also
answers a broader call for negotiation research to examine the effectiveness of
intervention at various stages of dispute resolution (e.g., Moore 2014). For example,
Moore notes in his review of the negotiation literature, “not enough is known to specify
in an unqualified manner the conditions under which early entry is superior to late
intervention” (Moore 2014, 237). Based on a review of current literature, this study
marks the first experimental investigation of how the effectiveness of RP intervention
approaches can vary based on the stage of issue resolution in which they are
implemented. As such, this study provides a test for the ripeness theory of third party
intervention that is commonly described but untested in the negotiation literature.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains the first
study in which I interview practicing audit partners to learn about the steps taken to
manage the auditor-client relationship during partner rotation events. Chapter 3 contains
the second study examining how one step taken to manage the auditor-client relationship
(i.e., assignment of relationship partners to a subset of engagements) influences the
resolution of contentious financial reporting issues. Chapters 2 and 3 each include
sections to introduce the study, explain the background and relevant theories, describe the
research method, present the results, and discuss the implications of the study. Chapter 4
presents a conclusion on the dissertation as a whole.
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CHAPTER 2
MANAGING THE AUDITOR-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP THROUGH PARTNER
ROTATIONS: THE EXPERIENCES OF AUDIT PARTNERS
2.1. Abstract
Partner rotation rules clearly and explicitly delineate engagement partner tenure and
cooling-off requirements, but these rules do not specify how firms must coordinate and
manage partner rotations. In fact, audit firms state in transparency reports that they take
steps to minimize disruption when engagement partner rotations take place, yet it is
unclear what these actions entail or the potential effect of these actions on auditor
independence and audit quality. In this study, I conduct semi-structured interviews with
20 U.S. engagement partners across five of the largest public accounting firms. I share
these interviewees' insights and experiences about how firms manage the auditor-client
relationship around these sensitive rotation events. Further, I consider how voluntary
actions taken to manage the auditor-client relationship and audit firms' motivation for
these actions map onto the underlying themes of Social Exchange Theory ("SET").
Partner interviewees describe how firms identify appropriate candidate partners for
upcoming rotations, logistics of planning for rotations, and procedures followed to select
and prepare the next engagement partner. Interviewees also elaborate on audit firms'
relationship-managing activities in the post rotation period (i.e., the early phases of
tenure) that have the potential to influence the future auditor-client relationship. My study
helps inform regulators and researchers about the ongoing process by which engagement
partners are selected for rotation onto clients, an understudied area that has potential
implications for auditor independence, in which investors and regulators continue to
express interest.
5

2.2. Introduction
Based on beliefs that longer engagement partner tenure leads to reduced
objectivity, Section 203 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, U.S. House of Representatives
2002) mandated more frequent rotation of the engagement partner and concurring review
partner (i.e., rotation every five years as opposed to seven years). With this mandate,
regulators expected that providing a fresh perspective would strengthen auditor
objectivity and independence, ultimately increasing audit quality. Yet, archival research
examining the effects of partner rotation documents mixed results, leading to a complex
understanding of the effects of engagement partner rotation on audit quality. In some
studies, shorter partner tenure is shown to have a positive effect on audit quality, in line
with regulators' goals (e.g., Carey and Simnett 2006; Fargher, Lee, and Mande 2008;
Lennox, Wu, and Zhang 2014). However, in other studies, shorter partner tenure is shown
to impair audit quality, contrary to regulators' objective (e.g., Chen, Lin, and Lin 2008;
Chi, Huang, Liao, and Xie 2009; Litt, Sharma, Simpson, and Tanyi 2014).
Of key importance is that the prior literature often examines partner rotation as a
single event in time in which the outgoing engagement partner signs his fifth audit
opinion, essentially handing the keys over to the incoming partner (e.g., Fargher et al.
2008; Litt et al. 2014). Yet, there is evidence that these partner transitions are far more
complex and time intensive than they appear, which may be contributing to the mixed
findings of partner rotation on audit quality. That is, audit firms briefly indicate in their
transparency reports that they take steps to minimize disruption when engagement partner
rotations take place (KPMG 2015; EY 2015; Deloitte 2015; PwC 2015), and academic
survey results indicate that engagement partners begin "auditioning" for the next
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engagement partner role well in advance of the actual transition (Daugherty, Dickins,
Hatfield, and Higgs 2012). Importantly, auditing standards merely lay out the maximum
number of years in which engagement partners are allowed to remain on the engagement,
along with the length of the "cooling off" period (five years) in which they cannot work
on the engagement (U.S. House of Representatives 2002; SEC 2003; SEC 2014). This
leaves audit firms a great degree of latitude to manage and implement rotations as they
see fit. Taken together, this suggests that, in substance, rotation may be a more ongoing
process than a single event in time.
Thus, the overarching goal of this study is to gain a clearer understanding of the
events and exchanges taking place between audit firms and their clients (i.e., the audit
committee and client management) in the period surrounding a partner rotation. I analyze
these exchanges between audit firms and their clients with the use of Social Exchange
Theory (SET) (e.g., Blau 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). SET focuses on
understanding the nature of both economic (i.e., monetary) and social (i.e., symbolic or
intangible) exchange transactions between two parties. Given the lack of prescriptive
guidelines for managing engagement partner rotations, I pay particular attention to the
voluntary actions taken by audit firms and the motivation behind these actions as
suggested by SET (i.e., what benefits audit firms may receive in return for such
endeavors) (e.g., Deckop, Cirka, and Anderson 2003; Slack and Morris 2015). This
insight is important when considering the mixed academic findings on auditor rotation
and the opportunities for future research on how rotation planning events affect auditor
independence and audit quality.
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I examine these issues by conducting 20 semi-structured interviews with highly
experienced U.S. engagement partners who have experience planning for and going
through engagement partner rotations. The insights shared by these engagement partners
provide an understanding of how firms manage the auditor-client relationship during
partner rotations. I analyze the content of the interviews using SET to shed light on the
voluntary actions taking place between auditors and their clients, as well as the
motivation behind audit firms' actions (e.g., Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005).
Partner interviewees report how they plan for upcoming rotations. They describe
how audit firms identify appropriate candidate partners and elaborate on other logistics of
internal planning to create continuity during transitions. For instance, interviewees report
voluntarily assigning non-decision making, senior partners as relationship liaisons
(commonly referred to as "relationship partners") to a subset of engagements (in part to
help facilitate partner rotations). In the period preceding a rotation, relationship partners
will gather information regarding client preferences for the next engagement partner and
client expectations about how many candidate partners they would like to meet during the
process. Interviewees note that relationship partners provide an additional safety valve to
ensure there is limited disruption to the auditor-client relationship during rotation events.
When the auditioning of engagement partners is complete and the next partner is
selected, interviewees shed further light on the time and resources invested by the firm to
ensure the incoming engagement partner is equipped to hit the ground running when
rotation takes place. Overall, interviewees stress that firms' emphasis on the auditor-client
relationship is not limited to the period immediately preceding an engagement partner
rotation, further supporting the idea that engagement partner rotations in practice are
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more of an ongoing or gradual process as opposed to a single event in time. Audit firms
monitor the auditor-client relationship in the post-rotation period using relationship
partners and/or annual client satisfaction surveys. If any contentious issues warrant
additional attention and/or intervention, interviewees report that relationship partners can
help to mentor the new engagement partner and can help navigate the relationship with
the client.
In addition to the favorable economic implications (e.g., client retention) from
properly managing engagement partner rotations, SET suggests that audit firms'
voluntary actions should lead to favorable social implications (e.g., Blau 1964;
Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). For instance, prior auditing literature notes that
developing positive relationships with clients is crucial for ensuring the smooth
completion of an audit engagement (e.g., Richard 2006; Guénin-Paracini, Malsch, and
Tremblay 2015). In fact, even small actions taken by auditors to appease the client are
found to lead to a more amenable client when navigating sensitive audit matters
(Sanchez, Agoglia, and Hatfield 2007). SET suggests that auditors' voluntary actions
highlighted in this study may lead to similar social implications as well as down-stream
economic implications.
Through depicting partner rotation events as an ongoing process, this study
provides opportunities for future research to consider the effect of these various steps on
auditor independence and audit quality. In addition, these findings will help inform
regulators and researchers about the process by which engagement partners are selected
for rotation onto their clients, an understudied transition about which investors have
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expressed continued interest (e.g., CAQ 2013) and which has potential to affect auditor
independence and audit quality.
In the next section of the paper, I describe SET, which I use to analyze the
interview data. The third and fourth sections include a discussion of the method and
results, and the fifth section reports my conclusions and implications for research and
regulators.
2.3. Social Exchange Theory And Audit Practice
SET examines exchange transactions that take place in organizational
relationships, based on the norm of reciprocity (e.g., Blau 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell
2005). SET posits that, due to an ongoing nature of interaction, one party will reciprocate
another party's behavior when resources are exchanged (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005).
However, it is important to note that, while some exchanges can be characterized
as more economic in nature, others take on more social forms (Blau 1964; Cropanzano
and Mitchell 2005). Economic exchanges deal with explicit or contractual agreements
between two parties. These types of exchanges are typically specified in advance, involve
monetary payments, and are more short term in nature. In contrast, social exchanges deal
with unspecified obligations between two parties, where the focus of the exchange is on
the voluntary actions that individuals display in social relationships (e.g., Blau 1964;
Slack and Morris 2015). While one party might reciprocate an economic exchange by
providing a monetary payment, this is not the case in social exchanges. Instead, the
benefits take on more of an intangible or symbolic value (e.g., personal interest, personal
satisfaction). For example, an employee might decide to help a co-worker finish an
assignment on time. There is no contract specifying that the employee must do so, but she
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does so voluntarily to help her co-worker make a deadline. In return for this employee's
voluntary decision to help, SET suggests that this will elicit benefits that are more social
or intangible in nature, such as feelings of personal obligation, gratitude, and trust in the
coworker (Blau 1964). As long as two parties follow the expected rules of exchange, this
can lead to long lasting, trusting, and loyal relationships (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005).
SET has been used to explain exchange relationships in a number of different
contexts in the management literature, such as knowledge sharing within organizations
(Chen and Choi 2005), employees' motivation to voluntarily engage in corporate social
responsibility within their organization (Slack and Morris 2015), and employees'
decisions to help other co-workers (Deckop et al. 2003). While a majority of the
management literature examining SET focuses on employee relationships within an
organization, this is not a requirement (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005).
I analyze my interview data with SET to understand the nature of exchange
transactions between key individuals in the audit firm and key individuals at the firm's
audit client. For example, to the extent that audit firms manage a partner rotation
effectively and find a partner who is a good fit for the client, this can ensure a positive
auditor-client relationship. There are both social (i.e., intangible) and economic benefits
that audit firms may receive in return for fostering a positive auditor-client relationship
through rotation management. Socially, a client might be more accommodating (i.e.,
more cooperative) on financial reporting issues in return for a more effectively managed
rotation. From an economic standpoint, audit firms that effectively manage rotations may
be able to minimize the potential loss of the client in the future. For example, Sanchez,
Agoglia, and Hatfield (2007) find that small steps taken by auditors to appease their
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clients can ensure greater client satisfaction and cooperation (i.e., a social implication)
and client retention (i.e., an economic implication). Additionally, a positive working
relationship encourages clients to provide information in a timely fashion and increases
the quality of the audit (Guénin-Paracini et al. 2015).
As partner rotation rules only specify that partner tenure cannot exceed five years
(followed by a five-year cooling-off period) (U.S. House of Representatives 2002; SEC
2003; SEC 2014), it is up to firms to manage partner rotations however they see fit. Audit
firms report that they take steps to minimize disruption during engagement partner
rotation events (KPMG 2015; EY 2015; Deloitte 2015; PwC 2015), yet they do not go
into any detail about what these actions entail. Further, there are indications in the
auditing literature that firms may place more of an emphasis on a client's wishes in the
period leading up to a partner transition in order to prevent a loss of the client (Fiolleau,
Hoang, Jamal, and Sunder 2013; Moroney, Knechel, and Dowling 2016). Yet, a better
understanding of how audit firms manage the auditor-client relationship to facilitate these
transitions is necessary, as is a clearer understanding of the motivation behind any
discretionary actions taken by audit firms. Given an absence of documented guidelines or
requirements of how firms must manage rotations, I investigate the voluntary actions, if
any, that firms engage in during this process to manage the auditor-client relationship and
any benefits audit firms may receive in return for these actions. In this paper, I thus
examine the following overarching research question:
RESEARCH QUESTION: How do audit firms manage the auditor-client
relationship during engagement partner rotations, and why are they
motivated to engage in such voluntary behavior?

12

2.4. Interview Method
I use a semi-structured interview method to address this research question. Guides
to conducting qualitative research suggest that qualitative methods are great for
addressing "how" questions (e.g., Pratt 2009). As such, I chose an interview method to
gain insight into how firms plan for and implement engagement partner rotations,
consistent with the approach employed in other qualitative studies in the accounting
literature (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright 2002; Gendron, Bédard, and Gosselin
2004; Cohen et al. 2011; Griffith, Hammersley, and Kadous 2015; Westermann, Bedard,
and Earley 2015; Westermann, Cohen, and Trompeter 2016). I interviewed 20
engagement partners with an average of 29 years of experience (range 21 to 37 years)
between November 2015 and July 2016.1 I initially recruited these interviewees from
personal contacts, followed by a "snowball" technique in which these initial interviewees
recommended others (Miles, Huberman, and Saldana 2014). These partner interviewees
are from five of the largest public accounting firms, where they work on a mixture of
public and private clients. The interviewees' experiences vary in terms of geographic
region, leadership roles, and industry focus. In addition to their experience as engagement
partners, eight interviewees also serve in leadership roles (e.g., managing partner of their
office), five others have current or past experience in national office roles (e.g.,
consultation, risk management), and three others have both leadership experience and
national office experience.2 Table 2.1 depicts interviewee demographics.
1

I felt comfortable that the point of saturation was reached (e.g., Power and Gendron 2015; Morse 1995;
Malsch and Salterio 2015) during the last several interviews. That is, the later interviewees (e.g., P18, P19,
P20) provided detailed accounts that were consistent with the information obtained in earlier interviews. As
described in the text, the quotes chosen by the author team for inclusion in the paper encompass accounts
from all 20 interviewees, and are representative of the findings from the interviewees as a whole.
2
Guides for conducting qualitative research suggest that obtaining interviewees with varying experiences
enhances the credibility of the interview findings (Adler and Adler 2008).
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The final version of my instrument contained six semi-structured interview
questions (some with sub-components) that were open-ended and neutral in nature (e.g.,
Hirst and Koonce 1996; Cohen et al. 2002; Cohen et al. 2010; Power and Gendron
2015).3 I followed-up with interviewees during the course of the interview when needed,
and I further allowed interviewees to speak openly about their experiences with as little
interruption as possible.4 After every few interviews, I reevaluated my interview
questions, allowing us to incorporate new topics that arose during the course of the
interviews (see also Hirst and Koonce 1996; Westermann, Bedard, and Earley 2015).
An interview approach allows us to learn about interviewees' experiences with
engagement partner transitions. To assist in developing the questionnaire, I reviewed
information from several sources: 1) the regulatory environment surrounding the rules
and interpretations for rotation of engagement, concurring, and "other" partners (U.S.
House of Representatives 2002; SEC 2003; SEC 2014), 2) audit firms' transparency
reports (PwC 2015; EY 2015; Deloitte 2015; KPMG 2015), 3) the academic literature on
engagement partner rotation (e.g., Fargher et al. 2008; Litt et al. 2014; Lennox et al.
2014), and 4) management and organizational behavior literature examining SET (e.g.,
Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005).

3

The first two questions pertained to interviewees' experiences with internal planning for upcoming partner
rotations, as well as their observations of the process of how appropriate candidate partners are identified
during such transitions. The third and fourth questions investigated interviewees' experiences with the
procedures that were followed when selecting the next engagement partner and the process by which the
incoming engagement partner prepares for rotation onto the client, respectively. The fifth question was
designed to investigate the early phases of the relationship in the post-rotation period. Finally, to ensure
interviewees have had the opportunity to express all points they want to emphasize, I concluded each
interview by asking a general question about whether there was any other information regarding partner
rotations that would be important to my understanding.
4
This approach of following up on responses and returning back to the interview script is a common
approach taken in the qualitative accounting literature (e.g., Hirst and Koonce 1996; Cohen et al. 2002;
Cohen et al. 2010; Power and Gendron 2015).
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Prior to beginning the interviews, I discussed the topic with two engagement
partners (with similar experience to the interviewees). I revised the script based on these
conversations and clarified questions where applicable. The interviews were completed
over the phone by at least one member of the research team, with the calls lasting an
average of 40 minutes (ranging from 25 to 60 minutes). Prior to beginning the interviews,
I informed interviewees that the objective of the study is to learn about any experiences
they have had with the process and planning that takes place at their firms when
preparing for engagement partner rotations. They were ensured that their identities would
be concealed and that all quotes used in the final research paper would be free from any
identifying information.5 Before beginning the interview, interviewees responded to a
series of questions to gain insight into their professional backgrounds, including
questions relating to their industry specializations, years of experience, and other roles
and responsibilities.
All but one interviewee consented to have the interview audio-recorded, and all
transcripts were transcribed by an independent, third-party professional transcription
service.6 Finally, as suggested in guides to conducting qualitative research, I provided
each interviewee with a copy of their transcript for review, thus allowing interviewees to
comment or make corrections/clarifications to their statements (Kenno, McCracken, and
Salterio 2017).
I developed a coding scheme for each question based on common themes that
emerged during the interviews. Throughout the course of the analysis, I reviewed and
5

To protect interviewee identities, I replace partner names with [Partner X] and firm names with [Firm X]
in the quotes reported. Additionally, I use identifiers (e.g., P1, P2, P3, P4) after each quote to indicate the
source of the comment and to protect the anonymity of the partner interviewees.
6
For the participant who did not want the interview to be audio recorded, two members of the research
team participated in note taking during the call, and notes were consolidated prior to being coded.

15

reread the transcripts to see if new insights emerged (Kenno et al. 2017) and refined the
coding scheme accordingly (Miles, Huberman, and Saldana 2014). Members of the
research team ultimately agreed the final coding scheme. The transcripts were uploaded
into NVivo (qualitative data analysis software) for formal analysis, where one member of
the research team and a PhD student (not on the research team) with five years of
auditing experience independently coded the transcripts in accordance with the predeveloped coding scheme. The two coders achieved an average initial intercoder
agreement of 89 percent. To ensure that this level of intercoder agreement exceeded what
would be predicted by chance alone, I calculated Cohen's Kappa, achieving a value of
0.78 (p < 0.01). The two coders met to reconcile disagreements. Data presented in this
paper is based on the reconciled coding of the interviews.
2.5. Insights And Analysis Of Partner Interviews
I describe audit firms' approach to planning for engagement partner transitions in
a chronological fashion as described by partner interviewees. I begin by describing audit
firms' procedures for identifying suitable candidate partners and logistics of planning for
rotations. I then discuss the process by which the next engagement partner is selected and
the shadowing period leading up to the formal transition date. I conclude by presenting
interviewees' description of audit firms' relationship managing procedures in the post
rotation period. A depiction of the process that partner interviewees describe is shown in
Figure 2.1 and is described in detail, with supporting quotes, in the following narrative.
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2.5.1. How Appropriate Candidate Partners are Identified for Upcoming Rotations
Firm Leadership Involvement
Starting about 12 to 18 months prior to the transition date (i.e., the signing of the
audit opinion in the outgoing partner's fifth year on the engagement), ten interviewees
(untabulated) note that the firms would begin discussions with the client about upcoming
partner rotations. These interviewees report that the timeframe would likely be toward the
high end of the range for larger or more sophisticated public companies.
The firm leadership involved in facilitating and managing these transitions with
the outgoing engagement partner also tends to be predicated on the size and complexity
of the client under consideration; the breakdown of involved individuals is depicted in
Table 2.2 Panel A. For larger or more complex clients, interviewees note that it is not
uncommon for the upcoming rotation to receive attention from sector and national office
leaders. In addition, a few partners report that the national risk management group at the
firm would be involved in these transitions to ensure the rotation is managed from a risk
perspective.
Many interviewees also report assigning relationship partners to a subset of their
accounts to assist the outgoing engagement partner in communications with the client
about upcoming rotations.7 All interviewees who discussed the role of the relationship
partner in the rotation process described the relationship partner's role as a voluntary
service that they provide to clients. In particular, they specified that relationship partners
are not assigned to every engagement due to limited resources. If a relationship partner is
not assigned to the engagement, interviewees note that another independent person, such
7

Different firms use different nomenclature (e.g., client service partner, senior relationship partner,
advisory partner). I adopt the generic term "relationship partner" as described in the SEC's application of
the auditor independence rules (see SEC 2014).
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as the local office managing partner, would generally play this independent role during
transitions. Having someone that is independent of the engagement team allows for an
open dialogue with the client about how things are going with the current engagement
partner and what qualities they are looking for in their next engagement partner (more on
these discussions in the following section).
Interviewees shed light on the qualities that make relationship partners wellequipped to have these conversations with the client, as shown in Table 2.2 Panel B.
Many interviewees note that relationship partners tend to be senior, very experienced
partners who are highly skilled in relationship management. One interviewee states: "I
think a great [relationship partners] is always a great engagement partner, [but] a great
engagement partner is not always a great [relationship partners]" (P1). Some interviewees
report that relationship partners often also serve in leadership roles. Interviewees note
that relationship partners do not have any decision-making or signing authority on the
engagement, as that is the role of the engagement partner. Instead, relationship partners
are there to help navigate the auditor-client relationship on a periodic basis (as will be
discussed in more detail later on in the narrative) and to facilitate transitions with the
client. The following quotes reflect two interviewees' accounts for what makes a good
relationship partner:
What we'll do [is] to try and identify somebody that we think, again, is a
good fit. Like my one client I was talking about - he's very active in [his
political] party and he's very community minded, so I'm trying to think of
a partner that has that same kind of community focus and preferably has
the same political leaning, you know, [who] could be that confidant for
him and help him navigate our firm as a global organization. (P15)
It's usually somebody high enough up in the organization that has a lot of
experience, is comfortable dealing with the C-Suite, and also has the
power and the knowledge of the firm to make sure that the engagement
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partner is doing everything and serving the client with all the resources
that the firm has to bear. (P8)
As noted above, many interviewees note that relationship partners are not
assigned to every engagement. That is, some interviewees report placing relationship
partners on larger or more sophisticated accounts. One interviewee reports, "From a pure
business standpoint, you don't want to lose a big account. If you're allocating scarce
resources, you're going to send them out to the larger accounts where you have more at
stake" (P8). But size is not the only quality that might drive a firm to consider placing a
relationship partner on an account. One interviewee comments, "It varies. It varies by
market. It varies by the individuals who run that market and where they want to invest in
relationships" (P5). Several interviewees follow up and note that firms may also decide to
place relationship partners on mid-size or smaller accounts. One interviewee states, "I
don't want a smaller client to think we're not putting a relationship partner on because
they're not important" (P10). Consistent with this notion, another partner reports, "We
definitely have some middle market accounts that we have [relationship partners] on.
Most of those would be assigned to a local leader, like the office managing partner,
because they see those people out and about in the city, at events" (P18). In addition,
"cross-board" situations may arise where a board member on a smaller client sits on a
board of a larger client that has a relationship partner. The firm might then make the
decision from a consistency perspective to place a relationship partner on the smaller
client as well. Ultimately, companies of any shape or size may be assigned a relationship
partner for any number of reasons, but due to the time commitment involved, this
resource is not mobilized on every client.
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In sum, rotations require involvement from a variety of individuals at the firms
(e.g., national office, current engagement partner). Additionally, while not a requirement,
firms see value in assigning relationship partner to a subset of clients. Relationship
partners have many years of professional experience and honed relationship management
skills, both of which help to facilitate conversations with the client and identify the
appropriate candidate partner(s). My interviewees view relationship partners as way to
promote open dialogue with the client about their expectations for an upcoming rotation
and to ensure the client's expectations are managed. However, interviewees stress that
relationship partners are a limited resource and cannot feasibly be assigned to each client.
In line with SET, there are social benefits that audit firms may receive from voluntarily
assigning valuable relationship partner resources to engagements. That is, interviewees
view a relationship partner's role as a positive way to manage the auditor-client
relationship and maintain client satisfaction. In fact, in line with SET, relationship partner
intervention is shown to lead client management to be more cooperative during
contentious auditor-client negotiations (see chapter 3). Greater client cooperation during
the audit is crucial for a smooth completion of the audit, providing a favorable social
implication for audit firms.
Gauging clients' preferences and expectations
Interviewees note that preliminary conversations with the client in advance of
rotation are important for two main reasons (see Table 2.2 Panel C). First, these
discussions provide an assessment of what qualities the client (i.e., client management
and the audit committee) is looking for in their next engagement partner. Second, these
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discussions allow for an assessment of clients' expectations regarding how many
candidate partners they are looking to meet.
Many interviewees state factors that may be expressed by the client when they are
considering what qualities are important in their next partner (see Table 2.2 Panel C).
One interviewee admits, "We joke around sometimes…they want a purple squirrel. Well
then we say, 'how many purple squirrels are there in the firm?' But we have to go find at
least one." (P11). In particular, some professional qualities that clients would like their
engagement partners to possess include industry, multi-national, technical, and national
office experiences. For instance, one partner notes: "If I can describe my perfect partner,
they would have served a client who looks just like me. They would have had some kind
of leadership role. Maybe they've been in the national office. They want somebody who
has done all those things already. They don't necessarily want to be the training ground
for someone" (P11).
Some interviewees also report clients' emphasis on diversity in their next partner.
One notes, "Our clients...want to see gender and racial diversity" (P12). Additionally,
many interviewees discussed the importance that clients place on the personality of the
incoming partner. One interviewee notes, "It's a people business. You tend to deal with a
lot of issues over a five-year period, and so the personalities [should] mesh… It certainly
makes for a long five years for everyone if they don't" (P7). Related to this, many
interviewees report that clients are looking for a partner who will fit in culturally with
their organization. Interviewees frequently referred to this as "chemistry": clients are
looking for a new partner who is a good listener, and with whom they will work well.
One interviewee notes, "Everybody's got their own unique style [or] approach to things,
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and some people tend to work well together. We call that 'chemistry'" (P8). Given the
extent of interaction with management that comes with the engagement partner role,
getting along with management and the audit committee is crucial:
It's really more of a fundamental relationship issue. Is this someone who
you could see having a productive working relationship with clients?
Auditing is inevitably adversarial in its nature... I think that you need to
have that balance of professional skepticism matched with a manner and
personal approach that sits well with the client. (P4)
As noted earlier, the second purpose of the firm's conversations with the client
leading up to rotation is to assess and manage the client's expectations regarding how
many candidate partners the client is looking to see, as shown in Table 2.2 Panel C. One
partner notes, "...the art is managing those expectations for all clients." (P16) For
instance, many interviewees note that clients may be looking for the firm to put forward
their best option and meet with that person to see what he/she is like. One interviewee
comments, "Some clients say, 'I don't want to go through that whole song and dance. I
trust you. You guys are great. Send out who you think is right.' Again, they could always
say, 'No, that doesn't work'" (P10). Yet, many interviewees also note situations where the
client may be looking to view a slate of two or three candidates where they can see
resumes and meet face-to-face with candidates that they express an interest in meeting.
These meetings allow the client to gain a sense of the style and chemistry of who will be
taking over the account. One interviewee notes, "We kind of joke around; we call it a
beauty contest where they're going to want to meet a few partners, see their resumes, and
then have a chance to have them interview with key stakeholders" (P12).
Half of the interviewees noted that it was often the larger, more significant clients
that expected to see a slate of multiple candidates. One interviewee notes, "In fairness to
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the client, they're paying, in some cases, millions of dollars in fees, so I don't think it's
unreasonable for them to have some input into the process and meet the people who are
going to be serving them" (P8). However, another factor driving clients' expectations to
see multiple candidates is the audit committee. One interviewee states, "I think it's
because they know from their interactions with other audit committee members that
[seeing multiple candidates] happens" (P16). Similarly, cross board relationships might
exist. A second interviewee notes, "If you had an audit committee chair of a smaller
public company that also happened to sit on the audit committee of a Fortune 500 audit
committee where he had seen this practice, he might ask for that particular situation"
(P8). Audit firms strive to remain consistent in their approach to the extent that they can
identify situations where cross-board relationships exist among their clients.
Interviewees shed light on the logistical challenges associated with presenting
multiple candidates to clients for consideration. Specifically, as tabulated in Table 2.2
Panel C, many interviewees describe this challenge with the analogy of shuffling pieces
around on a chessboard. When the firm presents multiple candidates for consideration by
a client, this effectively removes these candidates from the chessboard, at least
temporarily (i.e., removes them from consideration for other rotations). Further, a few
interviewees report that putting forward multiple candidates for the client to consider
leads to a much more involved and lengthy process. One interviewee notes, "each person
would meet with the candidates for maybe 45 minutes to an hour" (P9). Another
interviewee admits, "I frankly didn't like to have those situations where the client was
saying, 'Let me meet these people,' only because it took more time and effort to
coordinate all of that" (P8). Due to the logistical factors involved, considerable thought
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goes into including a candidate in one rotation versus another. Yet, even with the
logistical challenges, interviewees shed light on the positive side. One interviewee notes,
"You want this process to show the firm well also. You want to reassure your client that
we [have] a deep bench of really capable partners, anyone of whom [you could] choose
and be very happy [to have them] lead your audit" (P11).
In summary, interviewees describe the importance of preliminary conversations
with the client 12 to 18 months in advance of the rotation date. In these conversations,
firms can assess a client's preferences about desired engagement partner qualities and can
gauge the client's expectations about how many candidate partners they would like to
meet. Assessing and managing clients' expectations is thus critical for fostering a
successful rotation.
From a SET perspective, the actions taken by firms to manage clients'
expectations are voluntary in nature, which is common in social exchange transactions
(e.g., Blau 1964; Deckop et al. 2003; Slack and Morris 2015; Cropanzano and Mitchell
2005). Specifically, interviewees report that they are not obligated to provide a slate of
candidates for the client to consider, and some interviewees note the logistical challenges
involved in doing so. However, consistent with social exchange transactions, these
actions could provide a benefit for firms. In fact, seemingly minor steps taken by the
auditor to ease the transition for the client are shown to lead to greater client satisfaction,
greater cooperation on financial reporting issues, and higher likelihood of client retention
(Sanchez et al. 2007). This suggests that steps taken to manage clients' expectations may
provide social benefits for the auditors in the form of client cooperation during sensitive
financial reporting issues. Additionally, Guénin-Paracini et al.'s (2015) interviewees note
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that clients are more likely to correct a detected error when they are convinced the
auditors are nice people. SET suggests that voluntary efforts taken by audit firms could
result in a the social benefit of clients perceiving the auditors as individuals who care
about their preferences. This is key, as a positive working relationship is crucial for client
cooperation and assistance during the evidence gathering process (e.g., Richard 2006;
Guénin-Paracini et al. 2015).
2.5.2. Other Logistics of Planning for Rotations
Half of the interviewees describe various forms of strategic planning to minimize
disruption during upcoming rotations (see Table 2.3). Through such planning, these
interviewees report that they can ensure client satisfaction is maintained and auditor
dismissal is avoided. One interviewee notes, "Even though you might have five years or
four years to go, there might be structural ways that you might build your team to manage
that transition in an effective way" (P1).
In certain cases, interviewees report strategically planning the rotations of other
team members (i.e., the senior manager and concurring review partner). Interviewees
note that continuity can be maintained with a client by either keeping the senior manager
the same when a partner rotation takes place, or by placing a senior manager with high
prospects for partner promotion on a client to gain experience (prior to assuming the
partner role when promoted). Interviewees also note how they may coordinate the
planning of successions in the concurring partner role:
Let's say I've got two insurance partners…and I have a public company
insurance client. I wouldn't want to necessarily put one of them as the
engagement partner and one as the concurring partner because five years
from now when I need…a new engagement partner and concurring
partner, neither of them is going to be available. (P4)
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Additionally, some interviewees discuss how the seven years of permitted tenure
for "other partners" (see SEC 2014) provides an advantage for audit firms when planning
ahead for upcoming rotations.8 One interviewee reports, "The way the rules are, you can
serve five years as a lead partner, but seven total: two of those being an other partner and
five as the lead. Sometimes we're able to structure those types of situations" (P6).
Interviewees believe that this approach not only prevents knowledge loss, but also is
generally viewed positively by clients:
I was an other partner for two years before I could take over my signing
responsibilities on my last client. The partner who was there at the time
brought me out to introduce me and said [to the client], 'Hey, I'd like to
have [Partner X] be my [other partner] for a couple of years. That helps
me to balance out the things that I'm doing. It helps me to make sure that
you're served…If you like [Partner X] at the end of my rotation, [Partner
X] has a full five years available, [and] can slide in and become your
signing partner with zero disruption to your practice.' This kind of
eliminates that transition process because you bleed it in over the [other
partner] years. They were very open to that. (P11)
As shown in Table 2.3, some interviewees also note that new partners are often
difficult to place, as they do not have prior experience signing audit opinions. They note
that larger or more complex clients generally do not want to be the "training ground" for
a newly promoted partner. One interviewee reports, "You probably wouldn't want to put a
brand new partner on a Fortune-500 company. They tend to be more complex and have
more going on." (P8). Overall, interviewees report that it is challenging to get a newly
minted partner her first experience in a signing (i.e., engagement partner) role. These
interviewees suggest that these "other partner" roles provide one avenue for newly

8

The SEC uses the term "other partner" to refer to partners in other supporting roles who are not the
engagement partner (SEC 2014). While firms vary in the nomenclature used to describe individuals in these
roles (e.g., "working partner", "auxiliary partner", "other partner"), I adopt the standard "other partner"
terminology in all quotes throughout the course of the narrative to protect the identity of individual firms.
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promoted partners to gain experience, which allows them to become a more desirable
engagement partner that will be accepted by the client:
I had one situation a few years ago where we had a young partner who we
thought was ideal for a particular company. The client liked the
background but wasn't sure because the person hadn't been battle-tested.
How are they going to react when they're in tough situations? Are they
going to be hard to deal with? So, the deal we offered them was this
younger partner and I would tag team. I'd participate in any client
meetings. I'd participate in any of the technical decisions. As we thought
would happen, probably three-quarters of the way through the audit…the
client recognized that the younger partner was as capable as we said he
was so I faded into the distance. I was a safety net for the client in that
situation. (P14)
In summary, audit firms can plan ahead to minimize disruption caused by
rotations through avenues such as the use of other partner roles and keeping other team
members (e.g., senior manager; concurring review partner) the same when rotations
occur. Interviewees report that structuring situations where a partner spends two years in
a non-engagement partner role provides an opportunity for partners (particularly newly
minted partners) to gain knowledge of the client and begin building relationships prior to
taking over the engagement partner role.
As previously described, effectively managing rotations helps to minimize
economic implications such as a client potentially putting the audit up for bid or
requesting an early rotation of a partner. However, SET suggests social benefits for the
audit firm in return for these voluntary actions to create continuity during rotations. The
continuity constructed through strategic planning (i.e., use of other partner roles) can lead
to greater social benefits for the auditors as well, such as greater cooperation by the client
during contentious or sensitive audit-related matters (e.g., Wang and Tuttle 2009;
Schmidt and Cross 2014; Guénin-Paracini et al. 2015). Specifically, Wang and Tuttle
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(2009) find that clients send more integrative messages to their auditors when they are in
longer lasting pairs. These social benefits allow auditors to do their jobs and for the audit
to run smoothly (Guénin-Paracini et al. 2015).
2.5.3. Procedures for Selecting and Preparing the Next Engagement Partner
Examination of Resumes and Completion of Interviews with Partner Candidates
After gathering information about the clients' preferences and expectations, my
interviewees note that the client would have the opportunity to view candidate partners'
resumes and meet with them face-to-face (see Table 2.4, Panel A). When it comes to
making the decision, interviewees' responses vary in terms of the extent to which client
management is involved in selecting their engagement partner from among the candidate
partners. In many cases, interviewees report the involvement of members of management
and in this decision process, as shown in Table 2.4, Panel B. Overall, the rules state that
the audit committee is in charge of hiring and firing the auditors (U.S. House of
Representatives 2002). Interviewees report that this is ultimately always the case based
on the rules surrounding the role of the audit committee. However, consistent with prior
literature (e.g., Beasley et al. 2009; Cohen et al. 2010), my interviewees elaborate on the
interplay between the audit committee and client management, suggesting that there
seems to be some variation in terms of the extent to which management is involved in
helping to make this decision (see Table 2.4, Panel B).
Interviewees note that the audit committee determines the degree to which
management is involved in the selection process. About half of interviewees note that
management might give a recommendation, leaving the audit committee ultimately
responsible for the final decision. One interviewee reports, "Management can express a
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preference to the audit committee, because management wants to make sure that they get
somebody they can work with and that knows their business and that can deal with issues
in a timely matter" (P9). In contrast, other interviewees state that management might have
the main choice in the decision, where the audit committee then simply ratifies this
choice. One interviewee notes, "I would say the CFO drove the ultimate decision. The
audit committee chair probably would not have overridden the CFO" (P1). Another
interviewee notes, "You're generally not going to see an audit committee insist on an
engagement partner that the management team objects to. I think the audit committee
understands the working relationship aspects of this too" (P14).
In summary, interviewees report that the audit committee is ultimately responsible
for approving the engagement partner selection decision. However, consistent with
Cohen et al. (2010), interviewees state that management plays a role in this decision.
Interviewees note that while some audit committees may allow management (e.g., CFO,
Controller, CEO) to make a recommendation (with the audit committee maintaining
ultimate authority), other audit committees may instead delegate this decision to client
management, essentially rubber stamping or signing off on the choice. These
interviewees report greater insight into what may drive audit committees to abdicate this
decision to management, suggesting that some audit committees see the value in a good
working relationship between the incoming engagement partner and their clients.
Shadowing of Outgoing Engagement Partner by Incoming Engagement Partner
Once the new engagement partner is selected, he or she begins preparing for
rotation onto the client. In accordance with the tenure rules, about half of interviewees
note that the official date of transition would take place when the outgoing partner signs
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his fifth audit opinion (see Table 2.4, Panel C). Of these interviewees, three (untabulated)
note that while the outgoing partner cannot have any contact with the client after rotating
off, there may be instances in which they need to consult the incoming partner. One
interviewee notes, "It's not like you can't talk to [the outgoing partner]…you may
leverage the old partner because there might be issues that came up that were under their
watch that you need to talk to them about" (P7).
Many interviewees report that a period of shadowing the outgoing engagement
partner is crucial for getting an incoming partner up to speed on the engagement. They
note that this period generally begins about six to twelve months prior to the start of the
new partner's tenure.9 Consistent with firms' efforts to ensure limited disruption during
rotations (Deloitte 2015; PwC 2015; KPMG 2015; EY 2015), the idea is to make the
transition seamless. One interviewee notes, "We need to get involved earlier in the
process and not wait for rotation to happen. If you're literally waiting, 'okay, I'm now the
signing partner', [by] the time you pick up a 10K, that's going to create audit risk" (P20).
Another interviewee notes, "It is important that the new engagement partner have the
ability to run the show. It's like when the president takes the oath of office and he
becomes the new president. The old president goes away and that's it" (P4).
In the period leading up to the transition, many interviewees report that the
incoming partner gains an understanding of the company through attending key meetings
(such as audit committee meetings and audit planning and closing meetings each quarter)
and reviewing prior quarter workpapers. These key meetings provide an opportunity for
the incoming partner to kick-start relationships with the audit committee and

9

Some interviewees report that the shadowing period would begin on the early end of this timeframe for
the larger or more sophisticated clients.
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management at an early stage. One interviewee notes, "I actually attended audit
committee meetings leading up to the actual change in partner, just to get a good
understanding of how the audit firm/audit committee dynamic worked" (P4). By
attending internal meetings with the audit team, the incoming partner can learn how
things are done. Interviewees stress that the incoming partners are there to listen and
learn during these meetings, but are not involved in any decision-making. The idea here
is that, when the incoming partner takes over the account, he/she is up to speed and does
not need to rehash old ground:
[They are] not [involved] in every little thing, They don't shadow meetings
about auditing cash, but the substantive, real judgmental things that the
engagement partner is involved in. They will ride alongside [the
engagement partner] to really understand the decisions being made and
conclusions reached. So when that audit opinion is signed on February
28th, and they step in as the partner on March 1st, there is not a lot of
transition time. They are up and running and ready to go. (P2)
A few interviewees report that the outgoing engagement partner helps to train the
incoming partner. One interviewee notes, "[I'm] giving them a chance to make sure they
understand the issues, how I've addressed them, understand our audit process, and then
help begin them down the path of building a relationship with the client" (P15). The
outgoing engagement partner can also share her perspective on the personalities of client
contacts.
In sum, this shadowing period allows the new partner to hit the ground running.
This time commitment is not mandated by the rotation regulations, but is in line with the
voluntary acts of social exchange depicted in SET. That is, this shadowing period allows
engagement partners to enhance their client-specific knowledge and build relationships
early on, maximizing the effectiveness of their five years as the engagement partner. SET

31

suggests social benefits in return for these actions, including a client's greater feelings of
personal obligation, trust, and gratitude (e.g., Blau 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005).
For example, client management is more cooperative with the auditors on potentially
contentious financial reporting issues when the auditors have more established
relationships and greater client-specific knowledge (e.g., Wang and Tuttle 2009; Schmidt
and Cross 2014). Through reciprocation of auditor actions, SET suggests that audit firms'
shadowing efforts may lead to a favorable working auditor-client working dynamic.
2.5.4. Early Phases of the Relationship (Post-Rotation)
Interviewees indicate that the importance placed on ensuring a positive working
relationship continues after the incoming partner rotates onto the engagement. One
interviewee reports, "If an audit committee made a 'bad pick' [and] they said, 'this isn't
working', we would never respond with, 'well we'll talk about that again in three and a
half years.' We would say, 'okay let's talk about what's not working.' Then let's think
about how do we resolve that, and if that includes needing to swap out a partner, then
we'll do that" (P11). Thus, audit firms are committed to ensuring the rotation went
smoothly in the post-rotation period as well.
The firm uses various tools to take a "temperature check" with the client after the
rotation occurs and to make sure that they are fulfilling their needs from a service
perspective (see Table 2.5). While some interviewees indicate that annual client
satisfaction surveys provide feedback about how the relationship with the new
engagement partner is going, many other interviewees report that, if a relationship partner
is assigned to an engagement, she will check in with companies periodically as well.
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In responses to frequently asked questions about rotation rules for relationship
partners, the Office of the Chief Accountant suggests that relationship partners be
included within the scope of an other partner (i.e., seven year tenure with a two year
cooling off period). However, the Office of the Chief Accountant stresses, "these are not
rules, regulations or statements of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Further, the
Commission has neither approved nor disapproved them" (SEC 2014). Seven
interviewees (untabulated) elaborated on the rotation rules employed internally at their
audit firms, with a few noting that relationship partner tenure is limited to a maximum of
seven years on the engagement. Other interviewees note that, as relationship partners are
not responsible for decisions on the audit, they are not required to rotate and can stay in
their role on a continuous basis. One interviewee states, "With rotation happening every
five years, it's important for us to have some continuity, just from a relationship
perspective. If a client has some concerns around the team, they have someone that they
know, they trust, and they can go and talk to" (P20). This is especially helpful in the early
phases of the relationship, after the transition takes place.
The level of involvement a relationship partner has on a client varies from one
client to the next. One interviewee states, "I probably have four or five roles where I
serve as the [relationship partner]. Some of them are four hours a year; some of them are
40 hours a year. It really varies based upon what's needed with a particular client" (P17).
Many interviewees report that relationship partners generally play a more active role
when contentious or difficult issues arise between auditors and their clients. A few
interviewees report that sometimes when these sensitive issues arise, the relationship
partner can mentor the new engagement partner on how to proceed. One interviewee
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notes, "I can give [the engagement partner] a lot of ideas on how to work through and
navigate the challenges" (P14). Another interviewee notes, "If an issue comes up – a key
issue or an internal control issue – a lot of times the [relationship partner] will help
navigate the relationship with the client so the engagement partner isn't running on their
own." (P2).
A couple of interviewees elaborate on the relationship partner's role during
contentious issues, noting that the relationship partner provides a softer or more amicable
avenue to arrive at a resolution prior to escalating an issue to the audit committee. Thus,
audit firms see the benefit of preserving a positive working relationship through this
relationship partner resource:
The thing that makes this delicate is it's a little bit like international
diplomacy. You want to keep peoples' fingers off the button and not start a
war unnecessarily. If a CFO or partner wants to call the audit committee
chair, in effect you are sort of calling out the other person and saying 'you
are not playing nice in the sandbox'. In my experience I would say that 8085% of the time the auditor and management team have a shared interest
in working well together and resolving issues before getting to the audit
committee level. Both sides operate with respect, recognizing there is an
ongoing working relationship, and try to be open to working through
issues prior to escalating things… [In my role as a relationship partner],
usually I would go out and would be willing to listen. Often these types of
interactions would precede discussions at the audit committee level.
Again, clients don't want to escalate to the audit committee without
working through other channels to diffuse and resolve issues. They are
going to try to talk with their connections at the firm before resolving
issues with the audit committee. (P8)
Relationship partners are in regular communication with their teams. A few
interviewees note that staying up to date on issues as they occur allows relationship
partners to either jump in at the request of the engagement partner or wait until
management reaches out to discuss the issue. One interviewee reports, "A lot of times,
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the request to meet with the client would come from inside the engagement team.
Sometimes it would come directly from the client" (P8). Another interviewee notes,
"There have been cases where there have been sensitive topics, and the fact that I was
updated meant I could join the conversation right away and know what's going on and
have a perspective. I can tell people, 'Yes, I am aware of that topic; here is my two cents'"
(P19).
When a relationship partner intervenes in sensitive issues, nearly half of
interviewees report that the relationship partner can serve as a sounding board for the
client, providing them with an outlet (i.e., someone who is not the engagement partner) to
voice any concerns. One interviewee elaborates on this perspective, noting, "the
[relationship partner] will be another person at the firm that [the client] can feel
connected with and they can raise an issue with, where they won't impair the relationship
with their engagement partner" (P1). The following quotes highlight interviewees' views
of relationship partners serving a sounding board role:
[The relationship partner] keeps a relationship with the client so if the
client's unhappy with the engagement partner, or unhappy with something,
they have another place to go, another person to talk to. That person
knows the client, knows the people well enough that they can go have that
conversation. (P10)
It could be as simple as, 'we are finding your senior manager or tax partner
to be really difficult to deal with.' …Sometimes it helps to have that
[relationship partner] come in and just be that additional sounding board.
(P1)
Additionally, half of interviewees stress that there may be situations where the
client is having difficulty accepting the engagement partner's position over a contentious
or difficult issue, and the relationship partner can step in and side with the engagement
partner. One interviewee states, "Sometimes [the client] is just unhappy with an
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accounting answer they got, and you just have to look them in the eye and explain that
you guys need advice here and you might not like the answer, but we gave you the
appropriate professional response" (P8). Interviewees perceive that the relationship
partner in these scenarios acts as a safety valve for the engagement partner. One
interviewee suggests, "We [might] have clients that are having difficulty accepting the
resolution of an issue, and the relationship partner is the one bringing our perspective to
[the client], communicating the best solution, why the conclusion was reached, and why
it's appropriate" (P6). Another interviewee describes the relationship partner role as a
backup role for the engagement partner, noting, "The client needed to hear right off the
bat that the firm was speaking with a single voice, and that the guy with 20+ years [of
experience] in the business was supporting his partner" (P19). The following quotes from
interviewees describe how a relationship partner might step in to offer support to the
engagement partner or firm:
A real simplistic example might be we pushed the client to book an
additional reserve [and] the client didn't agree. They didn't think they
needed that reserve, but we insisted. Now the client's unhappy. But at the
end of the day, if we thought our partner did a good professional job…I
would say something like, 'Well, I hear you and understand your concerns,
but we really think this adjustment was appropriate under these
circumstances.' (P8)
It protects the firm. It protects the partner to make sure that, if the partner
is taking a position on certain issues and the client is grouchy, it helps the
engagement partner to have another partner out there saying, 'I know this
is a tough message but it's the firm's message. It's not the partner's
message.' It gives the partner support. (P14)
Two interviewees (untabulated) also noted that showing support for the
engagement partner might involve utilizing the national office. One partner noted, "part
of my conversation was to let [the client] know that we had two or three consultations at
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the highest levels away from the engagement, away from the region. This is a national
consultation, but we had concluded that [our firm] was down this path and that was the
answer" (P19).
In summary, interviewees stress a continued, ongoing cycle of commitment to the
client. In addition to their role facilitating conversations with the client in the period
leading up to the rotation, relationship partners assist in navigating the auditor-client
relationship after the rotation as well. Audit firms' voluntary assignment of relationship
partners is consistent with the notion of social exchange outlined in SET. As described
earlier, firms are not obligated to assign a relationship partner to a client, and
interviewees stress that relationship partners are a limited resource. Interviewees view a
relationship partner's role as a positive way to navigate and maintain a positive auditorclient relationship. Consistent with the social benefits suggested by SET, relationship
partner intervention can lead to more client cooperation during contentious issues (see
chapter 3). While this is just one social benefit leading to the smooth completion of the
audit, further research is needed to examine other social implications of relationship
partner involvement, as well as any second-order economic implications.
2.6. Discussion
This study presents results of interviews with 20 engagement partners to gain an
understanding of how audit firms plan for and implement partner rotations in practice.
Given audit firms' reports that they strive to minimize disruption when rotations occur
(KPMG 2015; EY 2015; Deloitte 2015; PwC 2015), I shed light on what is involved in
this planning process (see Table 2.6 for a summary of major findings). Specifically, I pay
close attention to the voluntary actions taken by firms to manage the auditor-client
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relationship through these sensitive events, consistent with the notion of social exchange
outlined in SET (e.g., Blau 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). The data reveal that
engagement partner transitions are much more complex than just a single point in time in
which one partner transitions the engagement to another partner.
Many voluntary actions that interviewees describe are in line with the themes of
social exchange outlined in SET (e.g., Blau 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). For
instance, managing clients' expectations surrounding an upcoming partner rotation (i.e.,
assessing a client's expectations about the number of candidates they would like to see
and desired qualities in the next engagement partner), investing time and resources to get
an incoming partner up-to-speed (i.e., the period of shadowing the outgoing partner), and
assigning relationship partners to a subset of engagements to manage the auditor-client
relationship are all voluntary actions taken by firms. Through such actions, audit firms
can ensure proper management of clients' expectations surrounding engagement partner
rotations, in turn fostering a long-lasting relationship with the client. SET suggests that
such voluntary actions to ease the transition for the client should provide social (i.e.,
intangible) and economic benefits for the auditors. In general, auditing literature
documents that actions taken by auditors to appease the client can lead to greater client
satisfaction and cooperation (i.e., a social reward) during financial reporting issues, as
well as greater client retention (i.e., an economic reward) (Sanchez et al. 2007). Further,
client management is more cooperative with auditors with whom they have stronger or
more established relationships (e.g., Wang and Tuttle 2009; Schmidt and Cross 2014).
This study reports engagement partners' experiences and one interpretation, based
on SET. As such, future experimental and archival research could corroborate these
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findings and empirically test the implications suggested by SET. For instance, given
firms' actions to manage client's expectations well in advance of partner transitions, what
implications do such precautions have for the client's relationship with the current
partner? In addition, how does the client management's involvement in the selection
decision influence the future auditor-client relationship? Finally, given that relationship
partners tend to be seasoned individuals at the firm, how does their experience and
presence in identifying suitable candidate partners affect the broader financial statement
audit?
This study is based on engagement partners' experiences with managing rotations
and, thus, there might be incentives to describe their firms in as positive a light as
possible. However, the interview questions were designed to gather auditors' experiences,
rather than to assess their opinions regarding the effectiveness of these approaches.
Further research with financial executives and audit committee members may shed light
on companies' experiences with partner rotations. Such an examination may provide a
broader understanding of how clients reciprocate auditors' actions in these dynamic
relationships (e.g., Blau 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005).
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Figure 2.1
Model of Partner Rotation Process as Described by Interviewees
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Table 2.1
Interview Participant Demographics

Number of
Percentage
interviewees
of
(n = 20)
interviewees
Panel A: Gender
Male
Female

16
4

80
20

3
10
7
6
10
10

5.6
18.5
13.0
11.1
18.5
18.5

8
54

14.8
100.0

Panel B: Industry specialization
Financial services, including mutual funds, banks, and
insurance
Consumer/Industrial products
Retail/Consumer
Manufacturing
Healthcare (life sciences, medical devices, etc.)
Technology
Other (utilities, real estate, automotives, not-for-profit,
services)
Total a
a

The total exceeds the number of interviewees (20) reported in the study as many report more than one
industry specialization.
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Table 2.2
How Appropriate Partner Candidates are Identified for Upcoming Rotations
Number of
Percentage
interviewees
of
(n = 20)
interviewees
Panel A: Designated firm leadership assistance
Dependent on size and complexity of the client
Office managing partner
Relationship partner
Sector leader
National office
Risk management group

7
14
17
7
7
5

35
70
85
35
35
25

13
11
7
7

65
55
35
35

12

60

18
7
7
2

90
35
35
10

Personal characteristics:
Personality
Chemistry
Diversity

16
14
6

80
70
30

Evaluating clients’ expectations relating to the number
of partner candidates they would like to see:

11

55

16

80

17

85

10

50

13

65

Panel B: Relationship partner characteristics
No decision-making authority
More experienced, senior partners
Skilled in relationship management
Firm leadership
Panel C: Firms gauge clients’ preferences and
expectations
Assessing clients’ preferences pertaining to desired
partner qualities
Professional characteristics:
Industry expertise
Multinational/international experience
Technical experience
National office experience

Client expects to see the single best candidate put
forth by firm
Client expects to see a slate of two or three
candidates
Client expectations driven by size and complexity
of company
Logistical challenges with presenting multiple
candidates
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Table 2.3
Logistics of Planning for Rotations

Number of
Percentage
interviewees
of
(n = 20)
interviewees
Rotation of other engagement team members (senior
managers, concurring review partners)
Auxiliary/other partner roles
Placement of newly minted partners
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5
7
8

25
35
40

Table 2.4
Procedures Followed When Selecting And Preparing The Next
Engagement Partner For Rotation
Number of
Percentage
interviewees
of
(n = 20)
interviewees
Panel A: Examination of resumes and completion of interviews with partner
candidates
Examination of resumes
Completion of interviews

11
19

55
95

Panel B: Interplay between audit committee and management regarding candidate
preferences during selection process
Audit committee allows management to express a
preference, but retains ultimate authority over
decision*

10

50

Audit committee delegates decision to management,
and ratifies the decision*

9

45

Involvement in selection decision:
CEO
Internal audit
Audit committee
Board of directors
CFO
Controller

14
5
18
4
17
13

70
25
90
20
85
65

Panel C: Shadowing of outgoing engagement partner by incoming partner
Incoming partner officially rotates upon signing of
outgoing partner’s fifth audit opinion
Shadowing period begins six to twelve months prior to
rotation
Period of shadowing is dependent on size and
complexity of client
Incoming partner gains an understanding of the
company
Incoming partner attends key meetings
Incoming partner is coached by outgoing engagement
partner
Incoming partner reviews audit approach and/or prior
quarter workpapers

9

45

15

75

7

35

16
15

80
75

5

25

8

40

* Note: A few interviewees report that both of these situations may occur, and that it generally depends on
how the audit committee chooses to handle the process.
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Table 2.5
Early Phases of the Relationship (Post-Rotation)

Number of
Percentage
interviewees
of
(n = 20)
interviewees

Periodic check-ins by relationship partners
Annual client satisfaction surveys

15
5

75
25

RP role during sensitive issues:
Serves as a sounding board for client
Supports the engagement partner’s position
Mentors audit partner

12
9
10
3

60
45
50
15

45

Table 2.6
SET – A Summary of Theoretical Expectations and Major Findings
Panel A: Theoretical expectations
When engaging in social exchange transactions, one party’s voluntary actions lead to
reciprocated benefits from a counter-party that are more social (i.e., intangible) in
value (e.g., happiness, personal interest, personal satisfaction) (e.g., Cropanzano and
Mitchell 2005; Blau 1964).
Panel B: Presentation and analysis of major findings
Major findings

Analysis of major findings

1. Firm leadership (e.g.,
RPs) holds discussions
with the client to
evaluate preferences
(relating to what
qualities they would
like to see in their next
engagement partner)
and expectations
(regarding how many
candidates the client
would like to meet with
during the process).

1. By facilitating conversations with the client about
upcoming rotations, audit firms can appropriately
manage the clients’ needs and accommodate their
wishes. Firms are not obligated to dedicate time for
these discussions, nor are they required to provide a
slate of candidates for the client. In fact, some
interviewees note they generally would not do so
(due to logistical issues) unless the client expressed
this expectation. In addition to ensuring client
satisfaction (i.e., an economic benefit), SET suggests
that these voluntary actions should lead to social
(i.e., intangible) benefits as well (e.g., greater client
cooperation during financial reporting issues).

2. The incoming
2. This voluntary time commitment allows firms to
engagement partner
make the most of the five-year tenure clock with the
shadows the outgoing
client. The new partner can begin building
partner in preparation
relationships with key client contacts early, ensuring
for rotation. This allows
a long-lasting relationship with the company. SET
the incoming partner to
suggests that auditors’ greater investment in the
attend key meetings
auditor-client relationship from an early point and
and gain an
greater client-specific knowledge should lead to
understanding of the
benefits for the auditors (e.g., Blau 1964). Prior
company and key
literature finds that stronger auditor-client
issues.
relationships lead to more amenable clients during
the financial statement audit (e.g., Wang and Tuttle
2009), suggesting that auditor actions in this setting
may also provide a similar benefit. Future research is
necessary to corroborate this conjecture.
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3. RPs assist in navigating 3. RPs are a limited resource; there is not an
client relationships on
enforceable contract stipulating that a RPs must be
an ongoing basis,
assigned to an engagement. Audit firms view RPs as
especially during
a positive way to ensure a long-lasting relationship
sensitive issues.
with the company (consistent with the notion of
social exchanged outlined in SET). In fact, RP
intervention during contentious issues leads client
management to be more cooperative with the audit
partner, thus benefiting the auditing firm (see
Chapter 3 of this dissertation).
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CHAPTER 3
THE INFLUENCE OF “RELATIONSHIP PARTNERS” ON CLIENT MANAGERS’
NEGOTIATION POSITIONS
3.1. Abstract
Maintaining a positive auditor-client relationship is critical for audit firms. One voluntary
action firms might take to maintain a positive relationship is to assign non-decisionmaking liaisons (often referred to as relationship partners or “RPs”). RPs can play a
major role in navigating the auditor-client relationship during sensitive issues, yet little is
known about their influence on issue resolution. I conduct an experiment with financial
executives to examine the influence that RPs may have on the resolution of subjective
issues between auditors and their clients. I also consider how RP influence may vary
depending on the extent to which the audit partner and client manager have tried, albeit
unsuccessfully, to resolve the issue (i.e., negotiation “ripeness”). I find that, in a
traditional setting in which a RP is not assigned, client managers concede less toward a
position deemed appropriate by the audit partner when the negotiation has reached a
more ripe stage (i.e., a stalemate) than when the negotiation stage is less ripe. However, I
find it is at a more ripe stage that RP intervention is more effective at building trust in the
audit firm and moving client managers toward a resolution. These findings suggest that
RP intervention can provide an end to a stalemate, limiting the risk of seeking alternative
methods of resolution that may impair the auditor-client relationship (e.g., issuing a
qualified audit opinion). My study informs audit regulators about the influence that a RP
(a non-decision making party) can have on the audit process and provides insight to audit
practitioners about how to effectively utilize RP resources during auditor-client
disagreements. Additionally, through a test of the ripeness theory of third party
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intervention, this study presents a contribution to the general negotiation literature by
responding to a broader call for research to examine how the impact of third party
intervention approaches can vary based on the stage of implementation.
3.2. Introduction
A strong working relationship with clients is critical for audit firms, particularly
when sensitive issues need to be resolved. One measure firms often take to maintain
positive working relationships and build these bonds is to assign senior leadership
partners to engagements as relationship liaisons. Frequently referred to as relationship
partners (hereafter, “RPs”), these liaisons do not hold any decision-making authority over
the audit (see Chapter 2 for further discussion).10 One major RP role involves helping to
navigate the auditor-client relationship during sensitive issues, such as disagreements
over estimates or accruals in which no clear-cut solution exists (see Chapter 2). However,
given their strong ties to both the audit firm and the client, it is not evident what influence
RPs may have on the resolution of such difficult issues. Further, since issues can take
days, weeks, or even months to resolve (Gibbins et al. 2001), it is unclear at what stage
RPs will have the greatest chance of success facilitating a resolution. Resolution of
sensitive issues is not only important for ensuring a positive auditor-client relationship,
but also has a critical link to overall financial statement quality (c.f., Brown and Wright
2008).
While auditor-client negotiations have received considerable attention in the
auditing literature, an emphasis is placed on the influence and negotiation tactics of the
primary negotiating parties: audit managers/partners and their clients (e.g., Trotman,
10

Yet even without decision-making authority, RPs remain on the SEC’s radar due to their high level of
contact with management and the audit committee (SEC 2014).

49

Wright, and Wright 2005; Bame-Aldred and Kida 2007; Sanchez, Agoglia, and Hatfield
2007; Hatfield, Houston, and Stefaniak 2010; Perreault and Kida 2011; Bennett, Hatfield,
and Stefaniak 2015). However, RPs can leverage their relationship skills and years of
experience as audit partners on their own clients to help navigate the relationship with
management during contentious issues (see Chapter 2). RPs thus provide another
potential avenue for auditors and management to resolve tricky or contentious audit
issues. In fact, in order to preserve a positive ongoing working relationship with
management, both auditors and management prefer to resolve issues together and with
the help of a RP prior to escalating the issue to the audit committee (see Chapter 2).
Yet, the negotiation literature conjectures that RP assistance during sensitive
issues may not always be successful. Negotiation researchers suggest that, when other
parties assist in the negotiation process, they “must consider whether it is the appropriate
time to enter the dispute” (Moore 2014, 190). While not yet empirically tested, the
ripeness theory of third party intervention postulates that negotiating parties will be more
receptive to assistance when the negotiation stage is more ripe. Negotiation literature
suggests that, in the absence of outside intervention, the presence of a stalemate may lead
negotiating parties to resist resolution (O’Connor, Arnold, and Burris 2015). However, it
is at this critical stalemate stage where the literature suggests that third parties will be
able to end a stalemate by moving negotiating parties toward a resolution, that is, when
the two parties’ attempts to resolve the issue have resulted in a stalemate (e.g., Zartman
2008; Fisher 2011; Duursma 2014).
In this study, I conduct an experiment to examine the influence that RPs may have
on the resolution of subjective issues between auditors and their clients, and how such
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influence may vary depending on the stage of the negotiation. In addition, I explore the
relative effectiveness of commonly reported relationship managing approaches used by
RPs in practice: serving as a sounding board for the client and siding with the audit
partner’s position (see Chapter 2). To examine these questions, I recruit financial
executive participants who assume the role of CFO and are provided with a subjective
audit issue that needs to be resolved with the external auditor. I manipulate the extent to
which the audit partner and client manager have made unsuccessful attempts to resolve
the issue at the current stage of the negotiation (as “less ripe” and “more ripe”) and the
approach employed by the RP when initiating discussion of the issue (as a "sounding
board for the client" approach and two approaches involving "siding with the audit
partner’s position") in a between-participants experimental design. Finally, I include two
baseline conditions (one for each stage of negotiation ripeness) in which there is no RP
assigned to the engagement (a situation common in practice due to resource constraints).
The incorporation of these baseline conditions allows for an examination of the influence
that RPs have at different negotiation stages.
I first consider how negotiation ripeness influences financial executives’
negotiation limits (i.e., the maximum amount of adjustment that they are wiling to accept)
in the absence of RP involvement. The focus on limit is due in part by the fact that a
movement in client managers’ limits can create overlap between the audit partner and
client manager. By creating an overlap with the audit partner’s position, a change in
client managers’ limits can provide an opportunity to end a stalemate.
I find that, without a designated RP, financial executives dig in their heels (i.e.,
they move less toward a position deemed appropriate by the audit partner) at a more ripe
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stage than at a less ripe stage. Financial executives' lower reported limits at this more ripe
stage (i.e., a stage at which they have made unsuccessful attempts at resolution) can be
particularly problematic. At this stage, there is a risk that the two parties may have to
seek alternative methods of resolution that may impair the auditor-client relationship
(e.g., involving the audit committee or issuing a qualified audit opinion). However, I find
it is at this more ripe stage that RP intervention is more effective in moving client
managers toward a resolution. Specifically, the RP is able to push client managers’ upper
bounds (reflected in higher reported maximum acceptable amounts) toward a position the
auditors deem appropriate (i.e., the proposed audit adjustment) when the primary parties
have tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to reach an agreement. In supplementary analyses, I find
that client managers' reactions to RP intervention are not significantly different when the
RP uses sounding board or side-taking approaches. Finally, I find that the influence of RP
intervention on client managers’ concessions at a more ripe stage is mediated by
perceptions of trust in the audit firm. Specifically, RP intervention builds trust in the firm
at this difficult stage, providing a path to end the stalemate and encouraging financial
executives to move toward the position the audit partner deems as more appropriate.
This study presents several contributions. This study informs audit regulators of
the impact RPs can have on the financial statement audit. In responses to frequently
asked questions about the mandatory audit partner rotation requirements, the SEC has
suggested limiting RP tenure to seven years on an engagement, with a two-year cooling
off period (SEC 2014). However, the SEC acknowledges that this is only a suggestion
and not a rule, and the findings of this study suggest that more frequent rotation of RPs
may not be as beneficial as regulators have conjectured. Additionally, these findings
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provide audit practitioners with insight about the stage at which RP intervention will be
most successful. Together, these findings suggest delaying RP intervention until the
primary parties (i.e., audit partner and client) have attempted to resolve the issue on their
own. The issues that have reached a more ripe stage do not always get resolved in an
amicable manner, thus affording an opportunity for RP assistance. Finally, this study also
answers a broader call for negotiation research to examine the effectiveness of
intervention at various stages of dispute resolution (e.g., Moore 2014). Specifically, this
study provides a test of the ripeness theory of third party intervention that is commonly
described in, but untested by the negotiation literature.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. I review the relevant
literature and develop my predictions in the next section. I then describe the research
design and report my findings in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Finally, Section 5
presents a summary of the findings as well as a discussion of the implications.
3.3. Literature Review And Hypothesis Development
Negotiation Ripeness
Auditor-client negotiations are widespread in the audit environment (Gibbins,
Salterio, and Webb 2001; Gibbins, McCracken, and Salterio 2005), with sensitive issues
(e.g., auditor-client disagreements over an appropriate estimate to be reported in the
financial statements) often taking days, weeks, or even months to resolve (Gibbins et al.
2001). This suggests that issues often require back-and-forth discussions between the
primary parties (i.e., audit partner and client) to arrive at a resolution. Negotiation
researchers have conjectured that a dispute is in a more ripe stage when the two parties
have been unsuccessful in their attempts to reach a resolution, often leading to a
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stalemate (e.g., Zartman 2008; Fisher 2011; Duursma 2014). Negotiation theory suggests
that the presence of a stalemate may lead negotiating parties to resist resolution, putting
strain on the relationship (Zartman 2008; Fisher 2011; Moore 2014; Duursma 2014).11
Failing to resolve a material issue leads to significantly negative consequences in
the audit environment. If an audit partner and client are unable to resolve the issue, they
risk seeking alternative methods of resolution that may impair their working relationship
(e.g., involving the audit committee or issuing a qualified audit opinion). Even more
problematic, multiple unsuccessful attempts to resolve an issue may actually increase the
risk that the auditor moves farther than he or she feels comfortable (leading to financial
statement quality implications). This is particularly troubling in the audit setting where
issues must be resolved in order for an audit opinion to be issued.
Prior research supports the idea that, when negotiating parties dig in their heels, it
becomes harder to get them to move (O’Connor, Arnold, and Burris 2005). In a setting
examining negotiations over two completely different sets of issues, O’Connor et al.
(2005) show that when negotiating over a separate set of issues, negotiators are more
likely to reach an impasse when they did not agree on an earlier set of issues. This
literature suggests a common overarching theme: prior bargaining history can influence
future bargaining behavior. This theme suggests that, in a setting where negotiators deal
with a single issue over multiple rounds, negotiators who have previously reached a
stalemate may more inclined to dig in their heels in a subsequent round. As such, I
predict that when issues are at a more ripe stage of negotiation, client managers may

11

The conflict management literature commonly describes the concept of ripeness in the context of
ongoing international conflicts in which there is no specified end date (e.g., Fisher 2011; Duursma 2014),
with the degree of ripeness relating to the lack of progress toward (and unsuccessful attempts at) reaching a
resolution as opposed to, simply, the passage of time.
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report lower negotiation limits (i.e., positions farther from an adjustment deemed
appropriate by the audit partner). Thus, I propose the following first hypothesis to
examine the influence of ripeness on client managers’ negotiation limits:
H1: Without outside intervention, client managers will report lower negotiation
limits when the negotiation is at a more ripe stage than when the negotiation
is at a less ripe stage.
Role of the Relationship Partner
Although a negotiation in a more ripe state is more likely to result in client
managers digging in their heels, their inability to make progress with the audit partner on
their own might lead them to be more receptive to outside intervention. One voluntary
measure audit firms take to maintain and build social bonds with the client is assigning a
non-decision making, senior leadership partner (i.e., a RP) to a subset of engagements.12
Sixty percent of audit partner respondents report that one major way in which RPs help to
strengthen the auditor-client relationship is through their role in navigating sensitive
issues (see Chapter 2). Importantly, auditors and management value a positive ongoing
working relationship. RP assistance during challenging issues provides a channel to
resolve issues amicably prior to escalating the issue to the audit committee, which may
put a strain on the working relationship (See Chapter 2). This qualitative evidence
naturally leads to the question of what influence RPs may have (if any) on the resolution
of such difficult issues, and what factors may influence such RP effectiveness.

12

While all audit engagements have a lead audit partner, due in large part to resource constraints, not all
engagements employ a RP (see Chapter 2). Additionally, different audit firms use different nomenclature to
label a relationship partner (e.g., Senior Relationship Partner, Account Executive, Advisory Partner, and
Client Service Partner) (see Chapter 2). In this study, I use “relationship partner” to describe a partner in
this role, mirroring terminology used by the Office of the Chief Accountant (SEC 2014).
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Through their many years of experience and skills in relationship management,
RPs possess qualities that are key for assisting in the resolution of difficult auditing
issues. When RPs assist in the resolution of subjective or contentious auditor-client
differences, they tend to use two types of commonly reported relationship managing
approaches: 1) acting as a sounding board or an outlet for the client to discuss the issue
with someone who is not the lead audit partner and 2) siding with the audit partner if
client management is having difficulty accepting the audit partner’s position (see Chapter
2).13
The Ripeness Theory of Third Party Intervention
In the audit environment, lead audit partners keep their RPs up-to-speed on
difficult issues during the course of the audit, providing them with information about the
stage of resolution of such difficult issues (see Chapter 2). Given that sensitive issues
frequently do not get resolved right away (Gibbins et al. 2001), RPs have many
opportunities to intervene, and it is possible that the stage of such interactions affects the
ultimate resolution of the issue. Psychology literature suggests that having an additional
influential person (in my case, a RP) involved in a negotiation should encourage parties
to move toward an agreement (e.g., Latane 1981).14 However this literature is silent about
whether the stage of intervention of the additional party would moderate this effect if it
exists.

13

Audit partner interviewees in Chapter 2 suggest that it would be unrealistic for a RP to indicate to client
management that they are siding with them over an issue. This would not only overturn the audit partner’s
decision-making authority, but would also be embarrassing for the firm as a whole (i.e., would not present
the firm as a unified body).
14
Bhattacharjee, Moreno, and Pyzoha (2014) examine the influence of the audit committee as an
“intervening party” in auditor-client negotiations; however it is important to note that the audit committee
can hold an authoritative, decision-making role given their oversight of the audit work (U.S. House of
Representatives 2002).
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While not yet empirically tested, negotiation researchers propose The Ripeness
Theory of Third Party Intervention (e.g., Fisher 2011; Moore 2014; Zartman 2008;
Duursma 2014). Specifically, negotiation researchers suggest that negotiating parties
might be more receptive to assistance from a third party at a more ripe stage in which
they have tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to arrive at a resolution (see Moore 2014 and
Fisher 2011 for reviews).15
However, it is important to note that RPs are not completely neutral “third
parties,” as they work for the audit firm and are thus aligned with the audit firm’s side
(rather than the client’s side). As such, it is unclear whether a RP (who by virtue of
employment is not completely independent) can be as effective as the broader negotiation
literature suggests a neutral third party can be. This leads to the natural question of what
influence RPs may have, and whether their influence may vary at different stages of the
negotiation in which they intervene.
Overall, negotiation researchers conjecture that late stage intervention allows
negotiating parties a chance to exhaust a variety of efforts to resolve the issue on their
own (e.g., Zartman 2008; Duursma 2014). If these efforts do not result in resolution, the
two parties may begin to seek the benefit of outside assistance (e.g., Rubin 1980;
Bercovitch and Houston 2000; Zartman 2008; Duursma 2014). For instance, Zartman
(2008) proposes that the presence of a stalemate could make a conflict more “ripe” for
third party assistance because negotiating parties will seek a way to avoid any negative
consequences of failing to arrive at a resolution. In his review of the negotiation
15

Auditing researchers have examined the implementation of negotiation strategies at different rounds of
negotiation. For instance, Tan and Trotman (2010) manipulated the round of negotiation in which
concessions were offered by the lead audit partner. In contrast, my study focuses on the examination of
relationship management approaches commonly used by RPs (i.e., non-decision-making senior leadership
partners) who are outside of the primary negotiating parties (i.e., audit manager/partner and client
management).
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literature, Duursma (2014, 96) offers a similar conjecture, noting “one would expect
conflicts, in which the disputants feel they are trapped in a costly predicament, to be more
prone to mediation success.” The conflict management literature suggests that third
parties are able to facilitate a resolution in the event of a stalemate by building trust
between the disputing parties (Greig 2005; Greig 2013).
Rubin (1980) suggests that disputants desire control over negotiations. Thus, if
third parties intervene too early (i.e., at a less ripe stage), intervention could be
unsuccessful. As such, I predict that RP intervention will be more effective in moving
client managers’ negotiation limits closer to a position the audit partner deems
appropriate at a more ripe stage (once parties have had a chance to exhaust their own
efforts to resolve the issue). Thus, I propose the following hypothesis to examine this
interactive effect:
H2: The difference in client managers’ negotiation limits between having a
relationship partner who intervenes and not having a relationship partner is
greater when the stage of the negotiation is more ripe than when the stage is
less ripe.
As briefly discussed above, RPs may serve as a sounding board for client
management when intervening during sensitive issues. Other times the RP may step in
and take the side of the lead audit partner when the client is having a hard time accepting
a position (see Chapter 2). Although sounding board and side-taking approaches are
frequently employed by RPs during subjective or contentious issues, observational
studies in the negotiation literature suggest that these approaches may come with
different connotations (e.g., Lim and Carnevale 1990; Ross et al. 1997; McLaughlin et al.
1991; Wall and Dunne 2012). Specifically, a side-taking approach by a RP is more biased
and direct in nature than serving as a sounding board for the client to talk about the issue
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(without expressing any opinion on the matter). Overall, it is uncertain whether one of
these approaches will be more effective at moving client management toward a resolution
(e.g., Moore 2014; Fisher 2011). While earlier theory suggests that RP intervention is
likely not as successful at a less ripe stage, it is unclear whether this is the case regardless
of the approach the RP uses. Additionally, it is not evident whether one of these
approaches may be preferential at a more ripe stage. As such, I propose the following
research question to examine the relative effectiveness of RP managing approaches:
RQ: Do common relationship partner managing approaches (i.e., sounding board
and side-taking approaches) differentially influence client managers’
negotiation limits, and do they do so at different stages of negotiation
ripeness?
3.4. Method
Participants
Two hundred and one financial executive participants were recruited with the
assistance of a third party data collection service. These financial executives are largely
upper-level management (e.g., 29 percent CEOs, 25 percent CFOs, and 26 percent
controllers), with 38 percent working at public companies.16 Of the participants, 42
percent are female, 34 percent are CPAs, 26 percent have public accounting experience,
and 26 percent have experience in audit committee roles. Participants’ average reported
level of experience participating in resolving differences with auditors is 6.8 on a scale
from 0 (not at all experienced) to 10 (highly experienced), and they have an average of

16

This third party data collection service initiates communication with all potential respondents who
become part of their pool of participants, so participation is requested by invitation only recruitment
campaigns. For this study, the third party data collection service targeted finance/accounting decision
makers in the consumer products manufacturing, industrial manufacturing, electronics manufacturing, and
retail industries. Participants who did not indicate CEO, CFO, or controller as their job title reported current
roles such as such as manager, management, director, or chief accounting officer.
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9.8 years of experience in a position that requires their involvement in the annual audit
process. Participants spent an average of 22 minutes on the experimental case.
The third party data collection service sent an email to participants that provided
them access to the experimental materials via an online link. While the third party source
provided an initial screening to help ensure individuals with financial executive roles
were targeted, the experimental materials began with additional screening questions.
These questions asked participants for their position and types of typical job
responsibilities in order to further screen for the requisite experience resolving audit
issues with external auditors. Those without the requisite task-specific experience did not
qualify for participation in the study.17
Task and Procedure
Participants begin the experiment by assuming the role of CFO of Wareham, Inc.,
a publicly-traded manufacturer of electronics equipment based in the United States.18
Participants are presented with background information, including a depiction of their
role at the company, select financial statement information, and a description of the
external auditors performing fieldwork during the year-end financial statement audit. In
the background information, they learn that Andrew is the lead audit partner. Participants
also read that the current year audit plan discussed with the external auditors is consistent
with prior years, with the same audit manager and audit partner, length of audit
fieldwork, and audit fees.
17

As noted in the text, the third party data collection service initially screened for participants with the
appropriate positions and industry experience. From the pool of potential respondents who met the target
requirements for participation, the data collection service sent 1,979 invitations to participate in my study,
of which 1,773 clicked the link to access the study in Qualtrics, agreeing to participate. Two hundred and
one participants qualified for participation (i.e., passed my screening and attention check questions) and
completed the study.
18
The case study is adapted from Bennett, Hatfield, and Stefaniak (2015).
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Participants then learn about one remaining inventory obsolescence audit issue
that has come up during the auditors’ fieldwork that has yet to be resolved. Specifically,
the audit partner has noted a difference between the auditors’ independent estimate and
Wareham’s estimate of inventory obsolescence, due to differences in the two parties’
approaches to estimating this account. Participants learn their (i.e., Wareham’s) stance
and explanation of their position, as well as the auditors’ proposed adjustment of
$5,230,000, which they feel is excessively conservative. They also learn about the current
stage (i.e., the ripeness) of the negotiation with the audit partner. All participants then
read that, since the auditors are closing in on the end of their fieldwork in the following
week, they will need to find some time to prioritize and resolve this issue.19 Participants
then report their planned negotiation limits (as well as their counter offers and goals) and
respond to post-experimental questions, including manipulation checks and demographic
questions.
Independent Variables
The two independent variables examined are the intervention approach used by
the RP and ripeness of the negotiation. The first independent variable, the RP’s
relationship managing approach, is a three-level factor in which the first two levels
manipulate whether the relationship partner employs a sounding board or a side-taking
strategy. As explained in more detail below, the third condition examines the RPs’ use of
a side-taking strategy, yet only after the client initiates discussion about the inventory
issue (as opposed to the RP initiating the discussion regarding the issue). The second
19

Although prior auditor-client negotiation research finds that financial executives’ negotiation positions
do not vary as a result of deadline pressure (Bennett et al. 2015), I hold the filing date constant across all
conditions to ensure participants do not assume the stage of negotiation (more ripe or less ripe) indicates
more or less time remaining to resolve the issue. Specifically, participants in all conditions are told, “Since
the auditors are closing in on the end of their fieldwork next week, you will need to sit down and figure this
out.”
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factor manipulates the stage of the negotiation at two levels: less ripe or more ripe.
Finally, there is a baseline condition for each stage of ripeness in which there is no RP
assigned to the engagement, resulting in a 3 ! 2 + 2 between-participants design.
The first independent variable manipulates the RP’s relationship management
approach. In all conditions, Andrew is introduced as the lead audit partner, responsible
for making all decisions on the audit. Participants in the three RP conditions are
introduced to a second partner, Rob, who works at the same audit firm as Andrew and
serves as their relationship partner. They are told that Rob has a great relationship with
their company and that he periodically checks in with management and the audit team.
However, participants learn that Rob is not responsible for any decision-making on the
audit.20 Information about the audit partner and the RP is provided in Appendix D,
Exhibits 5a and 5b. To mimic the strong (and socially oriented) relationship that clients
have with their RPs in practice (see Chapter 2 for further discussion), participants then
read about a brief voicemail message from Rob. In the voicemail, Rob states that it was
great catching up at the industry technical update event, and he suggests getting together
for lunch later in the week.
After learning about the inventory obsolescence adjustment proposed by the audit
partner, the RP intervenes prior to participants reporting their negotiation limits. I
manipulate the sounding board and side-taking approaches using audit partners’
descriptions of these approaches discussed earlier in Chapter 2. In all three RP
conditions, participants read in a narrative that the RP stops by while on site that day,
asking if they want to grab lunch. Participants confirm lunch and then later at lunch, the

20

In a check for understanding, all participants correctly indicated that the lead audit partner has decisionmaking authority over the audit and is responsible for signing the audit opinion and the RP does not.
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issue is brought up. In the sounding board condition, the RP initiates discussion of the
issue. He states that he wants to make sure that they have an outlet or someone outside of
the audit team with whom they can express their thoughts, and that he is there to listen.
There are two side-taking conditions in which the RP states that the audit partner’s
decision is appropriate, essentially siding with the audit partner’s position: hereafter,
“siding” and “client-initiated siding”. In the siding condition, the RP initiates discussion
of the issue. However, in the client-initiated siding discussion, the participant initiates
discussion of the inventory issue during the lunch meeting, seeking out the RP’s opinion.
Importantly, RPs may be asked to intervene in an issue via discussion with client
management or the audit partner (see Chapter 2). As such, the RP has the choice of
whether to preemptively bring up the issue or to wait. Examining both common scenarios
sheds light on whether side-taking by a RP is dependent on who initiates discussion of
the issue. Specific wording for the RP’s sounding board, siding, and client-initiated
siding approaches can be found in Appendix D, Exhibits 11a through 11c.
The second independent variable manipulates "ripeness" or the degree to which
the participant has attempted to resolve the issue with the auditor up until this point, as
less ripe or more ripe. As described earlier, the audit partner’s rationale and the
magnitude of the proposed adjustment (i.e., $5,230,000) are held constant across all
conditions, ensuring an equal starting point and information set for all participants. In
designing this manipulation, I incorporate attributes that the negotiation and conflict
management literatures suggest are key for differentiating a stage that is less ripe for RP
assistance versus one that is more ripe (e.g., Zartman 1985; Fisher 2011; Duursma 2014).
In the less ripe condition, participants learn that, while they have not yet come to an
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agreement on the issue, they have only had a brief initial conversation with the audit
partner. They are aware that they have differing opinions than the audit partner on the
issue, but have not yet met to try to resolve the matter. However, participants in the more
ripe condition learn that they have had several meetings with the audit partner, but have
been unable to reach an agreement on the issue.21 Specific wording for these
manipulations can be found in Appendix D, Exhibits 9a and 9b.
As mentioned above, the final two cells in the design represent another common
situation that occurs in practice in which a RP is not assigned to an engagement.22 A
baseline provides a benchmark from which to compare the influence of RP intervention.
In order to assess the effectiveness of the RP’s approaches in each stage of issue
resolution, I include a separate baseline condition in which no RP is assigned to the client
(for both the less ripe and more ripe stages).

21

Feelings of contentiousness are held constant across the less and more ripe manipulations. For example,
participants in all conditions read, “you and the audit partner have always maintained a positive working
relationship, but so far it seems like you are not seeing eye-to-eye over this issue”. Additionally,
participants read, “you realize that Andrew is not trying to be argumentative…” Further, I ask participants
to report the extent to which they feel discussions with the audit partner would be contentious on an 11point scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much). Participants' mean assessments do not differ between the
less ripe and more ripe conditions (means = 6.9 versus 6.5; p = 0.169, two-tailed).
22
Considerable thought went into the design choice to include baseline conditions with no mention of
either a RP or any intervention approach, rather than a baseline condition where the RP is introduced but is
disengaged (i.e., does not intervene). As RPs are not placed on every client (i.e., due to resource
constraints), these baseline conditions allow for an examination of the effectiveness of RPs during difficult
issues, compared to when a RP is not assigned to a client (see Chapter 2). Additionally, discussions with
several Big 4 audit partners confirm that it would be highly unrealistic for a RP to be assigned to an
engagement and be disengaged during a difficult or contentious situation. These partners noted that a RP’s
primary role is to preserve goodwill and having a RP assigned to a client but is disengaged during a
difficult issue would send a negative signal to the client. One partner noted that a disengaged RP would be
very problematic: “In the client’s mind, that would be an important service breach that would signal to the
client that either the RP is not aware of the issue or has chosen not to get involved, and neither of those is a
good situation.” Therefore, I avoid using a disengaged RP condition, which would be a problematic
benchmark condition from which to compare realistic RP behavior.
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Dependent Variables and Process Measures
The primary dependent variable of interest is participants’ planned negotiation
limits (i.e., the maximum amount of adjustment that they would be willing to accept,
assuming that a compromise with the audit partner continues to prove challenging) for
the upcoming meeting with the audit partner. The focus on limit is driven in part by the
fact that after back and forth attempts, any change in a client manager’s limit results in
movement closer to the auditor’s acceptable position. This provides an avenue to create
overlap between the two parties’ positions, affording an opportunity to end a stalemate.
To the extent that RPs are able to push client managers’ upper bounds (i.e., their limits),
this would reduce the need for the parties to seek alternative methods of resolution that
could impair their working relationship (e.g., involving the audit committee or issuing a
qualified audit opinion).
The range of possible limits is from $0 (i.e., participants are sticking to their
original position and do not want to concede any amount to the audit partner) to
$5,230,000 (i.e., participants ultimately agree to fully book the audit partner’s proposed
adjustment). Since participants’ limits are elicited in the form of adjustments to the
financial statements, the amounts recorded by participants reflect concessions from their
original position of $0 (i.e., no adjustment). Higher limits along this range lead to a
greater chance of overlap with a position the audit partner deems appropriate, thus
allowing for an end to the stalemate. I also measure two other common negotiation
measures: participants' counter offers (i.e., the amount that they would propose at the
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start of the upcoming meeting) and goals (i.e., the goal amount that they hope to convince
the audit partner to accept) (e.g., Hatfield et al. 2010; Bennett et al. 2015).23
Participants then respond to post-experimental questions, including manipulation
checks and demographic questions. As noted above, audit partner interviewees in Chapter
2 report that a RP is someone that client management can trust. While the Ripeness
Theory of Third Party Intervention does not make a priori predictions concerning
underlying process mechanisms, the conflict management literature suggests that a third
party is more effective in the event of a stalemate (i.e., a more ripe stage) as they are able
to build trust between parties and facilitate a settlement (Greig 2005; Greig 2013). Thus, I
ask participants in all conditions to report their perceptions of trust in the audit firm (e.g.,
Mercer 2005) to explore whether RP intervention at a more ripe stage results in higher
perceptions of auditor trust.
3.5. Results
Manipulation Checks
As previously described, participants are randomly assigned to one of two
ripeness conditions (i.e., less or more ripe). Participants rate the extent to which they
believe they had worked to resolve the issue with the audit partner on a scale from 0 (not
at all) to 10 (very much). Consistent with a successful manipulation of ripeness as
described in the negotiation literature, those in the more ripe condition rate the extent to

23

For the reasons discussed above, I focus on limit due to its ability to create overlap between the two
parties' positions and to end a stalemate. It is unclear whether the effects of RP involvement will manifest
in client managers' counter offers and goals, particularly given that their prior protracted discussions with
the audit partner resulted in no movement toward a resolution. As such, I make no formal predictions for
counter offers and goals.
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which they had worked to resolve the issue significantly higher than those in the less ripe
condition (means = 6.5 and 5.2, respectively; p = 0.001).24,25
To ensure participants perceive a difference between the RP employing a sidetaking approach versus a sounding board approach, I ask participants in the three RP
conditions to indicate the extent to which they feel the RP’s position was aligned with the
audit partner’s position on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much). Regardless of
who initiates the discussion of the audit issue (client or RP), participants’ feelings about
the extent to which the RP’s position was aligned with the audit partner’s position did not
significantly differ between the siding (mean = 7.9) and client-initiated siding conditions
(mean = 7.8; p = 0.776, two-tailed). This is consistent with the fact that the RP took the
side of the audit partner in both the siding and client-initiated siding conditions. Further,
on average, participants in the two side-taking conditions report feeling that the RP’s
position was aligned with the audit partner’s position more than those in the sounding
board condition (means = 7.8 and 7.3, respectively; p = 0.062). On a scale from 0 (not at
all) to 10 (very much), participants in the client-initiated siding condition rate the extent
to which they initiated discussion about the inventory issue significantly higher (mean =
7.1) than those in the siding (mean = 6.4; p = 0.042) and sounding board conditions
(mean = 6.1; p = 0.013). Together, the findings from these manipulation check items
suggest participants recognize the difference in RP approaches.

24

Reported p-values are one-tailed to reflect directional predictions, unless otherwise noted.
I also ask participants to assess their perceptions of control over the negotiated outcome to ensure they
are reacting to ripeness of the negotiation and not to perceived control (i.e., that they feel they have more
control over the outcome at a more ripe stage, where they have had multiple unsuccessful attempts to
resolve the issue). I find no significant differences between the less and more ripe conditions (means = 6.7
and 6.4; p = 0.269, two-tailed).
25
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Hypotheses Test Results
I first examine the influence of ripeness on financial executives’ negotiation limits
in the absence of RP intervention. Means by condition and statistical tests for H1 are
presented in Table 3.1, Panels A and B, respectively. Consistent with expectations, I find
that without RP intervention, financial executives’ negotiation limits are lower when the
issue is more ripe (mean = $2,323,203) than when the issue is less ripe (mean =
$3,107,542; p = 0.024). Thus, multiple unsuccessful attempts to resolve the issue with the
audit partner (i.e., a more ripe stage) lead financial executives to dig in their heels more,
supporting H1.
I next examine the influence of RPs on client managers’ negotiation limits and on
how the effectiveness of RP involvement may vary depending on the ripeness of the
negotiation. As shown in Table 3.1 Panel C, the interaction term of the ANOVA is
statistically significant for limit (F = 4.956, p = 0.014), offering support for H2 (see
Figure 3.1). 26 Specifically, when the negotiation is at a less ripe stage, financial
executives’ limits are not significantly different when a RP intervenes (mean =
$2,946,999) than when there is no RP intervention (mean = $3,107.542; p = 0.620, twotailed, untabulated). However, for issues that remain unresolved after multiple
unsuccessful attempts (i.e., issues at a more ripe stage), participants report higher
negotiation limits when a RP intervenes in the issue (mean = $3,233,816) than when
there is no such RP intervention (mean = $2,323,203; p = 0.005, untabulated). Thus,
consistent with the Ripeness Theory of Third Party Intervention, I find that RP
intervention is more effective at a more ripe negotiation stage. That is, the relationship
26

When examining the RP approaches (i.e., siding, client-initiated siding, and sounding board)
individually, the untabulated ANOVA interaction terms are as follows: siding (F = 4.242; p = 0.021);
client-initiated siding (F = 4.322; p = 0.020); and sounding board (F = 2.151; p = 0.073).
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with the RP, who has no direct decision-making authority on the engagement, helps the
firm when tough issues arise. In these intractable situations, RPs can push client
managers’ limits toward a position the audit partner deems appropriate, minimizing the
need to seek alternative methods of resolution that might impair the relationship.27
Relative Effectiveness of RP Managing Approaches: RQ Results
I next address the proposed research question by examining the relative
effectiveness of the sounding board, siding, and client-initiated siding approaches at less
and more ripe stages of the negotiation. The means for the different approaches are
displayed in Table 3.2 and are depicted graphically in Figure 3.2. When examining
financial executives’ limits, I find no statistical differences between any of the three RP
approaches (siding, client-initiated siding, and sounding board) at a less ripe stage (all pvalues > 0.598, two-tailed, untabulated) or at a more ripe stage (all p-values > 0.340, twotailed, untabulated), suggesting that they are all similarly effective at pushing financial
executives’ upper bounds toward the adjustment the audit partner deems appropriate. In
summary, the social ties of having a RP involved with the client (regardless of whether
the RP takes a siding, client-initiated siding, or a sounding board approach) are more
effective when the negotiation is sufficiently ripe.

27

As noted earlier, psychology literature suggests that the number and influence of individuals that exert
pressure on a target can influence the persuasiveness of a message (e.g., Latane 1981). If the results are
strictly based on the presence of an additional member of the audit firm in the RP condition, the results
should depict a main effect for RP intervention, such that RP intervention is always effective (in both less
ripe and more ripe stages) in persuading client mangers to move toward the audit partner’s position. In
contrast, as noted above, I find an interactive effect whereby RP intervention is only effective for issues
that have reached a more ripe stage. In addition, participants’ perceptions of audit firm credibility,
competence, and qualifications do not significantly differ between conditions (all p values > 0.221, twotailed).
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Supplemental Analyses of Financial Executives’ Counter Offers and Goals
Recall that the primary variable of interest is negotiation limits, given that a
change in financial executives’ limits can end a stalemate. However, consistent with prior
auditor-client negotiation research, I also report participants’ planned counter offers and
goals, finding results that are largely consistent with those reported for limit above.
Means by condition are presented in Table 3.3 Panel A, and statistical tests for H1 and
H2 are presented in Table 3.3 Panels B and C, respectively. In support of H1, I find that,
without RP intervention, financial executives’ counter offers and goals are lower when
the negotiation is more ripe (means = $2,046,914 and 2,018,949) than when the
negotiation is less ripe (means = $2,657,868 and $2,810,389; p-values = 0.091 and 0.032,
respectively).
I next examine the influence of RPs on client managers’ planned counter offers
and goals and on how the effectiveness of RP involvement may vary depending on the
stage of ripeness of the negotiation. As shown in Table 3.3 Panel C, the interaction term
of the ANOVA is statistically significant for counter offer (F = 3.698; p = 0.028) and
goal (F = 4.461, p =0.018) offering support for H2.28 Specifically, when the negotiation is
at a less ripe stage, financial executives’ counter offers and goals are not significantly
different when there is RP intervention (means = $2,245,2480 and $2,532,630,
respectively) than when there is no RP intervention (mean = $2,657,868 and $2,810,389;
p-values = 0.252 and 0.400, respectively, two-tailed, untabulated). However, for issues
that remain unresolved after multiple unsuccessful attempts (i.e., issues at a more ripe
28

When breaking out the analyses for counter offer and goal to examine the RP approaches individually,
the ANOVA interaction term is quantitatively similar for the siding (counter offer: F = 3.608; p = 0.030,
untabulated; goal: F = 3.599; p = 0.031, untabulated) and client-initiated siding approaches (counter offer:
F = 3.362; p = 0.035, untabulated; goal: F = 5.694; p = 0.010, untabulated), and qualitatively similar for the
sounding board approach (counter offer: F = 1.095; p = 0.149, untabulated; goal: F = 0.812; p = 0.185,
untabulated).
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stage), participants report higher negotiation counter offers and goals when a RP
intervenes (means = $2,611,646 and $2,725,922, respectively) than when there is no such
RP intervention (means = $2,046,914 and $2,018,949; p-values = 0.059 and 0.017,
respectively, untabulated). Thus, I find similar results for participants’ counter offers and
goals that are consistent with those previously reported for limit. That is, consistent with
the Ripeness Theory of Third Party Intervention, RPs are more effective in aiding
successful negotiation resolutions when issues have reached a more ripe negotiation
stage.
I next analyze the research question for participants’ reported counter offers and
goals (see Table 3.4 for means by condition). In terms of participants’ counter offers, I do
not find any differences between approaches at a less ripe stage of negotiation (p-values >
0.194, two-tailed, untabulated). However, at a more ripe stage of negotiation, I find that
participants report directionally higher counter offers when a RP employs a siding
approach (mean = $3,021,051) than when the RP utilizes a sounding board approach
(mean = $2,288,148), although this difference is only approaching marginal significance
(p = 0.114; two-tailed; untabulated). All other differences in participants’ counter offers
across the RP approaches are not statistically significant at a more ripe stage (p-values >
0.290, two-tailed, untabulated). The pattern of means (see Table 3.4) and statistical tests
are quantitatively similar for participants’ reported goals.
Process Measures
As expressed earlier, the conflict management literature suggests that, when
negotiations have reached a stalemate, third parties may be able to facilitate a settlement
by increasing one party’s perception of trust in the other party (Greig 2005, Greig 2013).
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I explore the possibility that RP intervention might be more successful at a more ripe
stage due to building client managers’ trust in the audit firm. To do so, I examine
participants’ reported levels of trust in the audit firm, recorded on a scale from 0 (not at
all) to 10 (very much). I find that, at a more ripe stage, financial executives’ reported
levels of trustworthiness are higher in the RP intervention condition (mean = 7.3) than in
the baseline condition with no RP (mean = 6.3; p = 0.056, two-tailed, untabulated).
However, at a less ripe stage, financial executives’ reported levels of trustworthiness do
not significantly differ between the RP intervention condition (mean = 6.9) and the
baseline condition with no RP (mean = 6.8; p = 0.965, two-tailed).29
Next, I explore whether participants’ greater levels of trust in the audit firm
mediate the relationship between RP intervention and participants’ pre-negotiation limits
using the bias-corrected bootstrapping method (Preacher and Hayes 2008; Hayes 2013). I
use the Hayes PROCESS macro to run 10,000 bootstrapped confidence intervals for
participants’ pre-negotiation limits (Hayes 2013). I find that when the stage of the
negotiation is more ripe, participants’ reported feelings of trust in the audit firm mediate
the relationship between RP intervention and their reported pre-negotiation limits (90%
of bootstrapped estimates of the indirect effect > 6,315.67). As shown in Figure 3.3 Panel
A, this positive indirect effect is a product of two positive links in the model: 1) the
positive link between RP intervention and trust (b = 0.467, p = 0.063, two-tailed) and 2)
the positive link between trust and participants’ pre-negotiation limits (b = 227821, p =
29

I also ask questions relating to fairness (e.g., Cohen et al. 2007; Bierstaker et al. 2012; Kaplan, Samuels,
and Cohen 2015) and affect (Watson, Clark, and Tellegen 1988), given the link in the negotiation literature
between such measures and decision-making outcomes (e.g., Cohen et al. 2007; Cohen-Charash and
Spector 2001). However, there is not a clear reason why participants’ affective reactions and perceptions of
fairness should differ as a result of RP intervention, as the end result in all cases is that they are asked to
book the audit partners’ proposed adjustment, which they feel is excessively conservative. And, in fact, I do
not find differences on any of these measures between conditions.
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0.002, two-tailed). However, when the stage of the negotiation is less ripe, trust does not
mediate the relationship between RP intervention and their pre-negotiation limits,
evidenced by a 90% confidence interval that contains zero (90% bootstrapped confidence
interval: [-47278.20; 49600.34] (see Figure 3.3 Panel B).
Finally, given the previously reported interactive effect of RP intervention and
negotiation ripeness on participants’ pre-negotiation limits, I explore whether the overall
index of moderated mediation is statistically significant by using Hayes’ PROCESS
model 8 to run 10,000 bootstrapped confidence intervals. In doing so, I find an
insignificant overall index for limit [-4049.39, 111342.34].30 Thus, it appears that it is
only in these stalemate situations (i.e., at a more ripe stage) that RPs are able to assist in
resolving the issue by building trust in the audit firm.
Taken together, these findings indicate that relationship management by RPs is
ineffective at a less ripe stage. At this stage, there may be common ground which the
client manager and audit partner may resolve the issue themselves. These findings
suggest that RP involvement in issues is best reserved for a more ripe stage, when
attempts by the client manager and audit partner to resolve the issue have proven to be
unsuccessful. As more ripe issues have not resulted in resolution, these are the ones that
have the greatest likelihood of impairing the auditor-client relationship, as they may not
get resolved in an amicable manner. Thus, RP intervention at a more ripe stage is able to
move client managers toward the auditors’ more appropriate position through building
trust in the audit firm. Resolution of sensitive issues is not only important for ensuring a
positive auditor-client relationship, but also has a critical link to overall financial

30

All mediation results reported in the manuscript are quantitatively similar for participants’ planned
counter offers and goals.
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statement quality (c.f., Brown and Wright 2008). It is at this more ripe stage where the
RP can push client managers’ upper bounds, leading client managers to ultimately move
toward the audit partner’s position, allowing for an end to a stalemate.
3.6. Conclusion
Audit firms place a great amount of importance on maintaining a positive auditorclient relationship, particularly when sensitive issues arise. One voluntary action firms
often take to ensure this relationship is managed appropriately is the assignment of senior
leadership partners without decision-making authority (i.e., RPs) to audit engagements
(see Chapter 2). With years of experience and polished relationship skills, one major role
that RPs play is helping to navigate sensitive issues that arise between the audit partner
and client management. However, it is unclear what influence, if any, RPs have during
such issues, or how their influence may vary depending on the stage of the negotiation. In
an experiment with financial executive participants, I find that, at a more ripe stage (i.e.,
one in which the audit partner and client manager have reached a stalemate), relationship
management by RPs is able to build trust in the audit firm and push participants’ upper
bounds toward a resolution that the audit partner believes is appropriate. As a result, RP
intervention has the ability to end the stalemate.
This study is subject to limitations, some of which I previously mentioned
throughout the paper. For example, as with most experiments, my experimental setting
lacks the richness that financial executives would generally have in practice. It is possible
that, in a richer environment, financial executives’ reactions to RP intervention might
differ from what I find in my study. Additionally, the experimental design does not
consider a condition in which there is a RP assigned to the engagement who is
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disengaged during contentious auditor-client issues. As previously mentioned, this design
choice was made after consultation with practicing audit partners who noted that it would
be highly unrealistic for this situation to occur (i.e., having a RP assigned to an
engagement who is disengaged during contentious issues). In the extremely rare case that
this does occur, these partners noted that this would send a negative signal to the client.
As I cannot speak to these cases with my study, future research could examine the effect
of having a disengaged RP during such challenging financial reporting issues to learn
more about the effect on negotiated outcomes.
This study offers several contributions. This study helps inform audit regulators of
the influence that RPs can have on auditor-client negotiations (and as a consequence,
audit quality). These findings indicate that audit regulators’ suggestion for more frequent
rotation of RPs may not be as beneficial as proposed.
Additionally, this study provides insight for audit practitioners about when RP
intervention will be most effective. These findings suggest that RP involvement in issues
is best reserved for a more ripe stage, when attempts by the client manager and audit
partner to resolve the issue have proven to be unsuccessful. This is important, because
more ripe issues have the greatest likelihood of impairing the auditor-client relationship,
as they have not resulted in resolution and may not get resolved in an amicable manner.
Finally, this study answers a call for negotiation research to examine the
effectiveness of intervention at various stages of dispute resolution (e.g., Moore 2014).
Specifically, this study provides a test for the Ripeness Theory of Third Party
Intervention, a described but untested theory in the general negotiation and conflict
management literatures.

75

Figure 3.1
Graph of Actual Results - Negotiation Limits
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Figure 3.2
Graph of Actual Results –Negotiation Limits by RP Approach
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Figure 3.3
MEDIATING RELATIONSHIP

This figure depicts the total effect of relationship partner intervention on client managers’ pre-negotiation
limits, as well as the indirect effect through trust. I used the bias-corrected bootstrapping method (Preacher
and Hayes 2008; Hayes 2013) to construct a confidence interval, based on 10,000 bootstrapped samples. As
shown, the indirect effect of relationship partner intervention through trust is significant when the stage of
the negotiation is more ripe. All p-values are two-tailed, unless otherwise noted.
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Table 3.1
Negotiation Limits
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Standard Deviation)
RP Intervention Presence
No RP
RP
Total

Ripeness

Less Ripe

More Ripe

Total

n = 25

n = 76

n = 101

3,107,542
(1,147,027)

2,936,999
(1,459,507)

2,979,213
(1,385,227)

n = 25

n = 75

n = 100

2,323,203
(1,552,799)

3,233,816
(1,590,069)

3,006,163
(1,622,169)

n = 50

n = 151

n = 201

2,715,373
(1,407,954)

3,084,425
(1,527,925)

2,992,621
(1,504,050)

Panel B: Test of H1
Comparison

df

t-statistic

p-value

No RP & Less Ripe > No RP & More Ripe

1

2.031

0.024

Variable

df

F-statistic

p-value

RP Intervention Presence (No RP or RP)
Ripeness (Less or More)

1
1

2.322
1.008

0.129
0.317

RP Intervention Presence x Ripeness (H2)

1

4.956

0.014

Panel C: ANOVA Results: Test of H2

Reported p-values are one-tailed for directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise.
Variable Definitions:
Limit: The maximum adjustment to inventory that financial executives are willing to accept.
No RP: The baseline condition with no relationship partner.
RP: Relationship partner intervenes to discuss the audit issue with the client manager using one of the
following strategies: sounding board, siding, or client-initiated siding.

79

Table 3.2
Negotiation Limits by RP Approach
Descriptive Statistics
Mean (Standard Deviation)
No RP

Sounding
Board

Siding

ClientInitiated
Siding

Total

n = 25

n = 25

n = 26

n = 25

n = 101

3,107,542
(1,147,027)

2,933,234
(1,546,507)

3,043,971
(1,376,799)

2,829,515
(1,505,346)

2,979,213
(1,385,227)

n = 25
More 2,323,203
(1,552,799)

n = 25
3,008,639
(1,572,736)

n = 24
3,446,479
(1,644,841)

n = 26
3,254,027
(1,589,231)

n = 100
3,006,163
(1,622,169)

n = 50
2,715,373
(1,407,954)

n = 50
2,970,936
(1,544,149)

n = 50
3,237,175
(1,509,411)

n = 51
3,045,933
(1,548,056)

n = 201
2,992,621
(1,504,050)

Less
Ripeness

Total
Variable Definitions:

Limit: The maximum adjustment to inventory that financial executives are willing to accept.
No RP: The baseline condition with no relationship partner.
RP Conditions: Relationship partner intervenes to discuss the audit issue with the client using one of the
following strategies: sounding board, siding, or client-initiated siding.
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Table 3.3
Negotiation Counter Offers and Goals
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Standard Deviation)

Ripeness

RP Intervention Presence
No RP
RP
Total

Variable

n = 25

n = 76

n = 101

Counter Offer

$2,657,868
(1,631,073)

$2,245,480
(1,439,775)

$2,347,556
(1,491,711)

Goal

2,810,389
(1,482,601)

2,532,630
(1,358,480)

2,601,382
(1,387,861)

n = 25

n = 75

n = 100

Counter Offer

2,046,914
(1,549,854)

2,611,646
(1,646,399)

2,470,463
(1,633,659)

Goal

2,018,949
(1,454,652)

2,725,922
(1,471,113)

2,549,179
(1,491,744)

n = 50

n = 151

n = 201

Counter Offer

2,352,391
(1,604,614)

2,427,350
(1,551,560)

2,408,704
(1,561,241)

Goal

2,414,670
(1,507,590)

2,628,636
(1,414,141)

2,575,410
(1,437,111)

Less Ripe

More Ripe

Total
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Table 3.3 Cont.
Negotiation Counter Offers and Goals
Panel B: Test of H1
df
No RP & Less Ripe > No RP &
More Ripe

Counter Offer
t-statistic p-value

1

1.358

0.091

Goal
t-statistic p-value
1.905

0.032

Panel C: ANOVA Results: Test of H2
Counter Offer
F-statistic p-value

Goal
F-statistic p-value

Variable

df

RP Intervention Presence (No RP
or RP)

1

0.090

0.765

0.848

0.358

1

0.232

0.630

1.646

0.201

1

3.698

0.028

4.461

0.018

Ripeness (Less or More)
RP Intervention Presence x
Ripeness (H2)

Reported p-values are one-tailed when the findings are in the hypothesized direction.
Variable Definitions:
Counter offer: The dollar amount of inventory adjustment that financial executives plan to counterpropose to the audit partner at the start of the upcoming meeting.
Goal: The goal amount of inventory adjustment that financial executives hope to convince the audit
partner to accept.
No RP: The baseline condition with no relationship partner.
RP Conditions: Relationship partner intervenes to discuss the audit issue with the client using one of the
following strategies: sounding board, siding, or client-initiated siding.
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Table 3.4
Negotiation Counter Offers and Goals by RP Approach
Descriptive Statistics
Mean (Standard Deviation)

Ripeness

Less

Variable

No RP

Negotiation Positions
Counter offer
Goal
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More

Negotiation Positions
Counter offer
Goal

Total

Negotiation Positions
Counter offer
Goal

n = 25
2,657,868
(1,631,073)

Sounding
Board
n = 25
2,206,700
(1,698,319)

Siding

Client-Initiated
Total
Siding
n = 25
n = 101
2,019,296
2,347,556
(1,277,075)
(1,491,711)

n = 26
2,500,251
(1,328,191)

2,810,390
(1,482,601)

2,613,581
(1,445,210)

2,772,008
(1,256,352)

2,202,724
(1,360,877)

2,601,382
(1,387,861)

n = 25
2,046,914
(1,549,854)

n = 25
2,288,148
(1,733,055)

n = 24
3,021,051
(1,432,602)

n = 26
2,544,790
(1,726,776)

n = 100
2,470,463
(1,633,659)

2,018,949
(1,454,652)

2,349,261
(1,468,252)

3,035,657
(1,357,989)

2,802,188
(1,549,127

2,549,179
(1,491,744)

n = 50
2,352,391
(1,604,614)

n = 50
2,247,424
(1,698,675)

n = 50
2,750,235
(1,390,135)

n = 51
2,287,195
(1,531,048)

n = 201
2,408,704
(1,561,241)

2,414,670
(1,507,590)

2,481,421
(1,448,002)

2,898,559
(1,299,475)

2,508,333
(1,476,635)

2,575,410
(1,437,111)

Variable Definitions:
Counter offer: The dollar amount of inventory adjustment that financial executives plan to counter-propose to the audit partner at the start of the
upcoming meeting.
Goal: The goal amount of inventory adjustment that financial executives hope to convince the audit partner to accept.
No RP: The baseline condition with no relationship partner.
RP Conditions: Relationship partner intervenes to discuss the audit issue with the client using one of the following strategies: sounding board,
siding, or client-initiated siding.

CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
This dissertation presents two studies that provide a descriptive framework and
empirical evidence about steps that auditors take to manage the auditor-client relationship
during sensitive events. In the first study, audit partner interviewees shed light on how
audit firms manage the auditor-client relationship to minimize disruption surrounding
audit partner rotation events. The second study provides an experimental examination of
one major relationship managing approach unveiled in the interview study relating to the
role of relationship partners. Specifically, this study examines the influence that
"relationship partners" have when they help to navigate the auditor-client relationship
during contentious or subjective auditor-client issues.
The first study contributes to the literature by shedding light on the ongoing
process by which audit firms plan for and implement partner rotations in practice. For
instance, interviewees describe how audit firms identify appropriate partner candidates,
procedures followed to select and prepare the next lead partner, and post-rotation
measures taken to manage the auditor-client relationship. For example, audit partner
interviewees report assigning very experienced, senior leadership partners (commonly
referred to as "relationship partners") as relationship liaisons to a subset of their clients in
order to help navigate the auditor-client relationship. With skills in relationship
management, one major ongoing role that relationship partners play is helping to navigate
the auditor-client relationship during partner rotations and other sensitive auditor-client
issues. Examining the interview data through the lens of Social Exchange Theory (e.g.,
Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; Blau 1964) provides a deeper understanding about how
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and why auditors take such voluntary measures to manage the auditor-client relationship
during these sensitive events. The findings of this study help inform regulators and
researchers about the process by which lead audit partners are selected for rotation onto
their clients. This understudied area has the potential to affect auditor independence and
audit quality, which, as a result, has generated considerable interest from investors (e.g.,
CAQ 2013).
The second study contributes to the literature by informing audit practitioners and
researchers of the impact relationship partners ("RPs") can have on auditor-client
negotiations, as well as the stage at which RPs will be most successful in moving towards
issue resolution. Resolution of sensitive issues is critical, due to their connection with
financial statement quality (c.f., Brown and Wright 2008). This study also answers a
broader call for negotiation research to examine the effectiveness of intervention at
various stages of dispute resolution (e.g., Moore 2014). For example, Moore notes in his
review of the negotiation literature, “not enough is known to specify in an unqualified
manner the conditions under which early entry is superior to late intervention” (Moore
2014, 237). Based on a review of current literature, this study marks the first
experimental investigation of how the effectiveness of RP intervention approaches can
vary based on the stage of issue resolution in which they are implemented. As such, this
study provides a test for the ripeness theory of third party intervention that is commonly
described but untested in the negotiation literature.
While this dissertation provides a deeper understanding of steps that audit firms
take to manage the auditor-client relationship during sensitive events, there are a number
of important questions left unanswered. Specifically, the first (interview) study only
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examines audit partners' descriptions of events taking place between auditors and their
clients in the period surrounding audit partner rotation events. This provides opportunities
for future research to empirically examine the influence of these individual firm actions
on the auditor-client relationship and audit quality. For instance, given audit firms’
actions to manage client’s expectations well in advance of partner transitions, what
implications do such precautions have for the client’s relationship with the current
partner? In addition, how does client management’s involvement in the selection decision
influence the future auditor-client relationship? Finally, given that RPs tend to be
seasoned individuals at the firm, how does their experience and presence in identifying
suitable partner candidates affect the broader financial statement audit? The second study
only considers the influence that RPs have on client managers' negotiation positions. A
related issue is how having a RP influences the negotiation process from the lead audit
partner's perspective. Overall, this dissertation provides a descriptive framework about
steps taken to manage the auditor-client relationship during sensitive events and
experimental evidence of how one relationship management measure can influence audit
quality.
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APPENDIX A
CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWS
Welcome to our research study
Thank you for your time and willingness to help me with this research project. The information
obtained from my conversations with audit partners will help to inform my dissertation at the
University of Massachusetts-Amherst. This study is being carried out by Mary Kate Dodgson,
along with her dissertation co-chairs at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Dr. Chris
Agoglia and Dr. Bradley Bennett. Your participation in this study is voluntary and you can
withdraw at any time. Agreeing to participate in this study means that you have learned about the
nature of the study and you are willing to contribute some of your time towards the exploration of
this very important issue. Thank you in advance for making the time during your day to
participate.
I believe there are no known risks associated with this research study. The objective of this study
is to learn about the process and planning that takes place at firms in preparation for audit partner
rotations. Any information I gather about your experiences as an audit partner will be used solely
for educational and research purposes. I will not be using your name or your firm’s name. Please
be assured that if individuating information is included during the interview, I will conceal
identities when reporting on this research. 20-30 interviews will be conducted, coded, and
aggregated. All interview data will be coded in a way that it cannot be connected to you. Any
direct quotes used in the final research paper will be free of any identifying information. In fact, if
you feel uncomfortable at any point during the conversation you can terminate your participation
in the research and all notes will be destroyed.
If you have questions about this project or if you have a research-related problem, you may
contact researcher, Mary Kate Dodgson at (856) 912-3026 or mdodgson@som.umass.edu. If you
have any questions concerning your rights as a research participant, you may contact the
University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Isenberg School of Management Institutional Review
Board Director Dr. Tony Butterfield at (413) 545-5678 or dabutter@isenberg.umass.edu.
By signing below and returning this form to the researchers, you are indicating that you are at
least 18 years old, have read and understood this consent form and agree to participate in this
research study, including to have the interview be audio-recorded.

_______________________

____________________

Participant Signature

Date
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APPENDIX B
CONSENT FORM FOR EXPERIMENT
You are being invited to participate in a research study titled “Examining management’s
judgment on audit-related issues”. This study is being conducted by Mary Kate Dodgson,
a Ph.D student at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. She has developed this
research study with her advisors, Chris Agoglia and Bradley Bennett, as part of the
requirements to complete her degree. You were identified to participate in this study
because of your professional experiences, and because I am interested in your judgments
relating to a hypothetical company.
The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding about decisions and judgments
made in certain business scenarios, including aspects of the financial statement reporting
process. If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to complete an online
survey. First, I will ask you a few questions about your professional background. If you
meet the requirements for participation, you will then be asked to provide your
professional response to the materials in the survey. If you qualify for participation, I
estimate that this study will take you between 15-20 minutes.
Your participation is completely voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any
time. If you have any questions or would like further information, please contact Mary
Kate Dodgson via email at mdodgson@som.umass.edu, Chris Agoglia at
cpa22@isenberg.umass.edu or Bradley Bennett at gbbennett@isenberg.umass.edu. If you
have any questions concerning your rights as a research participant, you may contact the
University of Massachusetts Amherst Human Research Protection Office (HRPO) at
humansubjects@ora.umass.edu or (413) 545-3428.
I believe there are no known risks associated with this research study. As with any online
related activity, the risk of a breach of confidentiality is always possible; however, this
study does not ask you to provide sensitive personal information, and to the best of my
ability, your answers in this study will remain confidential. I will minimize any risks by
deleting all identifying information linked to your responses. All reported results will be
aggregated, so your individual responses will be completely confidential.
I really appreciate your participation, as it will help us achieve greater knowledge about
the financial statement reporting process. Note, however, that it is possible that you may
not gain any direct benefit from your participation in this study.
By clicking “I Agree” below you are indicating that you are at least 18 years old,
have read and understood this consent form, and agree to participate in this
research study. Please print a copy of this for your records.
I Agree

I Do Not Agree
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APPENDIX C
EXPERIMENTAL SCREENING QUESTIONS

Before beginning the case, please provide information about your background by
responding to the items listed below.
1. Please select the options below which describe any responsibilities you may
encounter in your current role:
You may select as many options as are applicable.
•
•
•
•
•
•

Reviewing and approving the work of subordinates, in conjunction with the
financial reporting process.
Resolving audit issues with the external auditors during the annual financial
statement audit.
Providing explanations or documentation to Investor Relations for communication
with institutional and individual investors.
Providing documentation from my team’s work to the internal auditors for testing
and review.
Answering inquiries and requests from federal, state, and local tax agencies.
None of the above.

2. Which of the following industries do you have experience operating in?
You may select as many options as are applicable.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Services
Manufacturing
Retail
Wholesale
Not-For-Profit
Government
Technology
None of the Above
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APPENDIX D
EXPERIMENTAL CASE
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91

Welcome Screen

Exhibit 1

92

Background

Exhibit 2a

93

Financial Information

Exhibit 2b

94

This screen is present in the baseline conditions only.

Current Year Audit

Exhibit 3a

95

This screen is present in the relationship partner conditions only.

Current Year Audit

Exhibit 3b

96

Importance Question

Exhibit 4

97

Audit Firm Contacts Screen – Present in Baseline Conditions

Exhibit 5a

98

Audit Firm Contacts Screen – Present in Relationship Partner Conditions

Exhibit 5b

99

Audit Firm Contacts – Check for Understanding

Exhibit 5c

100

This screen is present in the relationship partner conditions only

Voicemail from the Relationship Partner

Exhibit 6

101

Introduction to Audit Issue

Exhibit 7

102

Background on the Audit Adjustment

Exhibit 8

103

104

105

More Ripe Manipulation

Exhibit 9a

106

Less Ripe Manipulation

Exhibit 9b

107

Ripeness Manipulation Check

Exhibit 10

108

Relationship Partner “Sounding Board” Manipulation

Exhibit 11a

109

110

Relationship Partner “Siding” Manipulation

Exhibit 11b

111

112

Relationship Partner “Client-Initiated Siding” Manipulation

Exhibit 11c

113

114

Scheduling a Meeting

Exhibit 12

115

Instructions to Dependent Variable Screen

Exhibit 13a

116

Dependent Variable #1 - Planned Counter-Offer

Exhibit 13b

117

Dependent Variable #2 – Goal

Exhibit 13c

118

Dependent Variable #3 – Limit

Exhibit 13d

119

Post Experimental Questions – Planned Negotiation Tactics

Exhibit 14

120

Post Experimental Questions – Materiality Assessment

Exhibit 15

121

Present Only in Relationship Partner Conditions

Post Experimental Questions – Relationship Partner Manipulation Checks

Exhibit 16

122

Post Experimental Questions – Control Variable

Exhibit 17

123

Post Experimental Questions – Fairness Perceptions

Exhibit 18

124

Post Experimental Questions – Control Variables

Exhibit 19

125

Post Experimental Questions – Audit Firm Satisfaction Measures

Exhibit 20
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